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DESELECTING BIASED JURIES 
 
Scott W. Howe 
 
Abstract 
 
Critics of peremptory-challenge systems commonly contend that they 
inevitably inflict “inequality harm” on many excused persons and should 
be abolished. Ironically, the Supreme Court fueled this argument with its 
decision in Batson v. Kentucky by raising and endorsing the inequality 
claim sua sponte and then purporting to solve it with an approach that 
preserved peremptories. This Article shows, however, that the central 
problem is something other than inequality harm to excused persons. The 
central problem is the harm to disadvantaged litigants when their 
opponents use peremptories to secure a one-sided jury. This problem can 
arise often—whenever a venire is slanted in favor of one of the parties. 
The advantaged litigant can use peremptories to seat a large group of 
favorable jurors regardless of how the disadvantaged litigant exercises its 
peremptories. The Court in the Batson cases only obliquely confronted 
that problem, because constitutional rulings cannot appropriately resolve 
it. However, there is a remedy. Peremptory systems reflect the idea that 
parties acting in their self-interests can help pursue group neutrality on a 
jury. Similarly, by conferring on litigants a right to stop peremptories at 
any time, states can enlist them to determine when opposing parties are 
using peremptories to promote group bias.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The peremptory challenge of potential jurors has ancient roots but a modern 
chorus of critics.1 The essence of the peremptory is that it requires no good reason,2 
unlike with a successful challenge for cause, when the challenger must convince the 
court that the potential juror is unable to follow the judge’s instructions or is 
                                                 
 © 2015 Scott W. Howe. Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Dale E. Fowler 
School of Law, Chapman University. I thank my colleagues at Chapman, particularly Larry 
Rosenthal, Associate Dean Dan Bogart, and Dean Tom Campbell. Most importantly, I thank 
Jetty Maria Howe for assistance at all stages of this project. 
1 See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 
74 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1683, 1713 (2006) (“The chorus of judges calling for the elimination 
of the peremptory, while still small, is nonetheless growing.”). 
2 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (“The essential nature of the 
peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated . . . .”); Lewis v. 
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892) (“[I]t is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and 
capricious right . . . .”). 
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otherwise unqualified.3 Although abolished in England in 19884 and not required by 
the U.S. Constitution,5 the tradition of allotting parties in a jury trial a number of 
peremptory challenges6 survives in the United States in both criminal and civil 
cases.7 The practice has long been rationalized as allowing parties to excuse venire 
members whom they fear may be secretly unqualified or biased and to facilitate 
vigorous voir dire by protecting parties against secret hostility that could develop in 
a venire member through pointed questioning.8 Yet, a variety of commentators, 
including several past and current members of the Supreme Court, have urged that 
the use of peremptory challenges leads to injustice.9 They assert that the practice is 
so troublesome that either the legislatures or the courts should abolish it.10 
Protests about peremptory challenges have focused largely on inequality 
concerns.11 Complaints have long arisen that parties can use peremptory strikes to 
discriminate against venire members based on factors such as race, ethnicity, and 
                                                 
3 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220. 
4 See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 272 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating 
that “England, a common-law jurisdiction[,] . . . has eliminated peremptory challenges”). 
5 Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988). 
6 The number allotted varies widely from state to state and between criminal and civil 
cases. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT 
ORGANIZATION 2004, at 228–32 tbl.41 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/sco04.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4P3T-HA5S. For example, different states give 
criminal defendants in a noncapital felony case anywhere from four to twenty peremptories, 
not counting extras allowed for the selection of alternate jurors. See id. In misdemeanor 
criminal cases and civil cases, the number tends to be lower. See id. 
7 See Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1471–
72 (2012) (noting that “despite criticism of the practice, every jurisdiction in the country 
continues to employ peremptory strikes” (citing Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, 
Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully 
Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1085 (2011))).  
8 See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27 
STAN. L. REV. 545, 554–55 (1975) (“Questioning in order to investigate the appropriateness 
of a cause challenge may have so alienated a potential juror that, although the lawyer has not 
established any basis for removal, the process itself has made it necessary to strike the juror 
peremptorily.”). 
9 See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 342–43 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring); Miller-El, 
545 U.S. at 267 (Breyer, J., concurring); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (1986) 
(Marshall, J., concurring); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be 
Abolished: A Trial Judge’s Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 827 (1997); Marder, supra 
note 1, at 1715; John Paul Stevens, Foreword, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 907, 907–08 (2003).  
10 See Collins, 546 U.S. at 342–43 (Breyer, J., concurring); Batson, 476 U.S. at 108 
(Marshall, J., concurring); Hoffman, supra note 9, at 809; Marder, supra note 1, at 1712–15; 
Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and 
Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 104 (2009).  
11 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The Court’s opinion cogently 
explains the pernicious nature of the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, 
and the repugnancy of such discrimination to the Equal Protection Clause.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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gender.12 Critics contend that those kinds of strikes harm the excused venire 
members both by denying them the opportunity to serve as jurors13 and by 
denigrating them for their membership in the protected class.14 Further, strikes of 
that sort allegedly harm the opposing party by implying that the trial court will 
tolerate unfair treatment not only of the excused jurors but also of the party.15 
Likewise, such discriminatory strikes allegedly undermine trial participants and 
observers’ confidence in the fairness of the judicial system, because they will see 
the treatment of the excused jurors as unjust.16 
Complaints about peremptories continue despite increased measures by the 
Supreme Court in recent decades to regulate them under the Equal Protection Clause. 
In Batson v. Kentucky,17 a prosecutor used peremptories against black venire 
members, and the defendant, who was black, objected.18 The Court held that the trial 
judge should have required the prosecutor to give reasons for the strikes and should 
have assessed whether the prosecutor discriminated on racial grounds.19 In later 
cases, the Court extended Batson beyond prosecutors,20 beyond criminal cases,21 and 
beyond race,22 and it also declined to require that the party or lawyer objecting to 
the strikes share the protected characteristic of the challenged venire member.23 Yet, 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221 (1965) (rejecting petitioner’s claim 
that a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to excuse black persons from the venire “is 
a denial of equal protection of the laws”).  
13 See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (asserting that a peremptory 
challenge based on race denies the excused person “a significant opportunity to participate 
in civic life”). 
14 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (“It denigrates the 
dignity of the excluded juror . . . .”). 
15 See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (“The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges 
by the prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury . . . because racial 
discrimination in the selection of the jurors . . . places the fairness of a criminal proceeding 
in doubt.” (citations omitted)); see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 (“The litigants are harmed by 
the risk that the prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect 
the entire proceedings.”). 
16 See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 413 (“The verdict will not be accepted or understood 
[as fair] . . . if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the outset.”). 
17 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
18 Id. at 83. 
19 Id. at 97. 
20 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (prohibiting criminal defendants 
from exercising peremptories to excuse black persons based on race). 
21 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (holding that a 
private litigant in a civil case could not use peremptories to exclude black persons based on 
race).  
22 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (holding that a state in 
a civil action to establish paternity could not use peremptories to excuse male jurors based 
on gender). 
23 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that “a criminal defendant 
may object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges 
whether or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same races”). 
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critics contend—and few others seem to disagree—that Batson doctrine has mostly 
enabled a “charade” of neutral reasons and has failed to do much to prevent strikes 
based on prohibited grounds.24 They also contend that abolition of peremptories is 
the only effective way to stop the “inequality harm.”25 
Despite the criticism and venerated positions of many critics, peremptory 
challenges remain the norm throughout the country.26 Various study groups 
appointed by national organizations and state governments have opposed abolition,27 
including the American Bar Association.28 No state has gotten rid of peremptory 
challenges, and the Supreme Court has never had a majority of members who 
appeared ready to abolish them or to recommend their abolition.29 The prevailing 
view among interested sectors of the legal profession is that if there is something 
wrong with the limited effect of Batson doctrine in restraining peremptories, there 
is something right about it, too.30 And, what apparently is deemed right is not that 
Batson doctrine has largely prevented peremptories based on race and gender but 
that even those strikes can help produce more neutral juries.31 The widespread 
resistance to ending peremptories suggests that claims that they continue to risk 
inequitable mistreatment based on race and gender have not persuaded lawmakers. 
In this Article, I will show that the standoff over peremptories does not mean 
retentionists are completely right and abolitionists completely wrong. Both positions 
                                                 
24 Judge Constance Baker Motley expressed this view in an opinion rejecting the 
purported reasons given by a party in a civil case for using peremptories to challenge two 
black persons and a Latino. See Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 185 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“It is time to put an end to this charade. We have now had enough judicial 
experience with the Batson test to know that it does not truly unmask racial discrimination.”); 
see also Marder, supra note 1, at 1706 (“Batson is so easy to circumvent that it allows a 
charade in the courtroom.”). 
25 See, e.g., Minetos, 925 F. Supp. at 185 (declaring that peremptories “per se violate 
equal protection”); Marder, supra note 1, at 1715 (“[E]limination of the peremptory should 
be the next step.”); Price, supra note 10, at 104 (contending that the best way to avoid “equal 
protection concerns” is to “remove them altogether”). 
26 See, e.g., Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 7, at 1085 (“It continues to be available in all 
American jurisdictions . . . .”). 
27 See Marder, supra note 1, at 1685–86.  
28 See AM. JURY PROJECT, AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 
14 (2005) (advocating that peremptory challenges be preserved), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/juryprojectstandards/principles.auth
checkdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KM2T-A8NK. 
29 Justices Breyer and Stevens were together on the Court at a time when both came 
close to expressing the view that peremptory challenges should be eliminated. See Marder, 
supra note 1, at 1714–15.  
30 See id. at 1685 (“Few trial lawyers want to relinquish the peremptory challenge.”). 
31 See id. at 1686 (“Even though . . . organizations or committees [focused on jury 
reform efforts], usually consisting of lawyers, judges, and academics, recognize that the 
peremptory challenge has been difficult to police and has led to juries that are less diverse 
than they might otherwise be, they have been unwilling to recommend the elimination of the 
peremptory.”). 
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miss the mark. Peremptories sometimes produce bad consequences, but the risk of 
inequality harm to excused persons is not the central problem. Likewise, 
peremptories do not warrant elimination, but Batson doctrine does not adequately 
regulate them.  
What is wrong with peremptories even after Batson is that they sometimes 
promote one-sided juries and thus have negative social consequences. Although 
some commentators have urged that what is mostly wrong with peremptories is that 
they reduce jury representativeness,32 this is, like claims about inequality, not the 
heart of the problem. Peremptories reduce representativeness but in pursuit of 
maximum jury neutrality, and a trade-off on that score is inherent in any kind of 
peremptory system. The real problem is that peremptories sometimes not only 
impair representativeness but also promote the opposite of neutrality—group bias. 
And Batson doctrine does not focus on preventing those outcomes even if it 
sometimes operates to prevent them. Where peremptories serve mostly negative 
social ends, there is a societal interest in disallowing them, but Batson doctrine is 
often nonresponsive.33 
Confusion over what social ends remain at stake with peremptories traces back 
to confusion about the meaning of impartiality at the level of the individual juror.34 
Individual impartiality represents not a bland neutrality but a wide array of 
permissible perspectives.35 The Court has not adequately clarified this point and, in 
the Batson line of cases, has denied it.36 Yet, the reality that individual impartiality 
constitutes an array of nondisqualifying sympathies helps reveal why, especially in 
light of Batson doctrine, peremptories based on generalized characteristics do not 
pose serious inequality harm to excused venire persons. Peremptory strikes need not 
be understood to accuse the excused persons of being unwilling or unable to follow 
the law or of being inferior citizens. Recognition of impartiality as an array of 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury 
Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 96–97 (1996) (“[T]his sort of 
discrimination violates the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury that represents the 
community.”); see also Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the 
Roles of the Jury, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1128 (1995) (noting that the Sixth Amendment idea 
of a fair cross section of the community provides “a better approach as a matter of legal 
theory”). 
33 Although not the basis for a proposal in this Article that Batson and its progeny 
should be overturned, Batson doctrine not only sometimes fails to limit peremptory 
challenges that serve purely negative social ends but also sometimes forecloses peremptory 
strikes that have social value. See infra text accompanying notes 195–203 & 243–245.  
34 See William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease but Killing the Patient, 
1987 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 125 (noting that the term “impartial” is “ambiguous in the context of 
jury selection”). 
35 See Scott W. Howe, Juror Neutrality or an Impartiality Array? A Structural Theory 
of the Impartial Jury Mandate, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1173, 1179–90 (1995). 
36 See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (denying that a venire person 
who is “predisposed to favor” a party could be viewed as impartial); United States v. Wood, 
299 U.S. 123, 145–46 (1936) (describing impartiality as a “mental attitude of appropriate 
indifference”). 
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acceptable biases means that, even when secretly based on race or gender, a 
challenge generally reflects only that one of the parties does not think the excused 
person would be the most favorable to it among the qualified venire persons in that 
particular trial.37 This action creates no serious inequality harm and does not warrant 
abolishing peremptories.38 
The idea of an impartiality array also helps clarify why peremptories 
sometimes, but not always, serve positive social ends. From a societal perspective, 
the hoped-for result of allowing peremptories is that each party will excuse venire 
persons who, although individually impartial, fall far on the opposite side of the 
impartiality array,39 resulting in a jury made up mostly of persons nearer the center. 
Yet, whether peremptories can help achieve that outcome depends in part on the 
makeup of the venire. When the venire starts out decidedly one-sided, peremptory 
challenges may not promote the seating of a neutral jury, but of a biased one. Even 
after Batson, the party aligned with a highly predominant perspective among the 
legally impartial venire persons can often exclude all or most of those persons who 
fall on the other side of the array while seating many who favor it. For example, 
when a prosecutor in a predominantly conservative county uses peremptory strikes 
to exclude those scarce venire persons who, although legally impartial, seem 
potentially open to the defense, the resulting jury is not only less representative of 
the community but also biased for the prosecution regardless of how defense counsel 
uses peremptory strikes. Such an outcome has negative social value. 
The dilemma of how to allow peremptory strikes that promote group neutrality, 
but not those that promote a one-sided jury, has no perfect solution. Rules or 
standards cannot effectively describe when peremptories promote group bias. 
However, in searching for a response to protests about unequal treatment of excused 
jurors, some scholars have suggested negotiated challenges,40 and a form of that 
approach—one requiring consent of the opposing litigant—can address the real 
tendency of peremptories to promote group bias.41 The idea of challenges by consent 
                                                 
37 See Pizzi, supra note 34, at 126 (describing peremptory challenges as “comparison 
shopping” to obtain jurors who a lawyer believes will be more sympathetic to one litigant). 
38 See Muller, supra note 32, at 149 (“This is not an equal protection harm . . . .”). 
39 See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 34, at 125 (noting that individuals can be “impartial” and 
yet still vary “in terms of values, religious beliefs, political leanings, experience, sex, race, 
background, and all those things that make each of us different”). 
40 See Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7 (2014) (endorsing negotiated peremptories as a remedy for the 
inadequacies of Batson doctrine in preventing inequality harm to excused jurors); see also 
Dru Stevenson, Jury Selection and the Coase Theorem, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1645, 1672 (2012) 
(contending that negotiation between parties about peremptories would “obviate the need for 
Batson challenges” and render Batson rulings “unnecessary”). 
41 While endorsing peremptories by consent of the opposing litigant, I urge an exception 
in capital cases. In that context, the defendant alone should be able to decide whether the 
parties will go forward with peremptories. The prosecution in a capital case can have the 
court excuse for cause all potential jurors whose views about the death penalty would 
“substantially impair” their ability to vote for it. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 
(1985). Research indicates that death-qualified jurors favor the prosecution not only on 
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does not correlate closely with a claim that attempts to locate the harm from 
peremptories primarily with the challenged juror.42 Yet, it fits well with a claim that 
locates the harm with the objecting litigant. As a response to the group-bias concern, 
the approach enlists parties to act not in the interests of venire persons, but in their 
own interests by stopping peremptories when they see their opponents using them 
to achieve one-sidedness.  
This Article, which does not seek to justify peremptory challenges but to 
explain why their use should depend on consent from the opposing litigant, proceeds 
in five parts. The first three parts rebut the case for abolishing peremptories on the 
notion that they pose inequality harm. Part II shows why the Court attempted to 
construct Batson doctrine on the theory that peremptory challenges cause inequality 
harm, primarily to excused persons. A history of efforts in some places to use 
peremptories to exclude all black persons from juries, at least in cases involving any 
white litigants or complainants, led the Court to demand reform, and equal 
protection was the best, albeit highly flawed, constitutional theory available to 
pursue it. Part III demonstrates the effect of the Court’s decision to regulate 
peremptories under the Equal Protection Clause on the discourse over peremptories. 
The rhetorical case about injustice the Court built up to justify limiting peremptories 
fueled an argument that the moral problem of inequality was irresolvable except by 
eliminating peremptories, even if Batson doctrine solved the technical, legal 
problem of unequal protection. Part IV shows why continuing claims of inequality 
harm to excused jurors deserve rejection as a basis for abolishing peremptories. This 
discussion demonstrates the reality of individual impartiality as a range of 
nondisqualifying biases, which helps reveal both why a peremptory challenge, even 
when secretly based on a disfavored stereotype, is not seriously harmful to the 
excused person and why it can promote the neutrality of the jury.  
The last two parts of this Article focus on the central problem from the 
continuing use of peremptory challenges and on the solution to that problem. Part V 
demonstrates that peremptory challenges sometimes exacerbate group bias on juries. 
This discussion reveals why devising rules or standards to define when peremptory 
                                                 
sentencing but also on guilt or innocence. See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 343–44 (3d ed. 2006). Despite this 
problem, the Supreme Court rejected the claim of a capital defendant that the Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury calls for a separate, non-death-qualified jury on guilt 
or innocence. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176–77 (1986). The Court concluded 
that removal of the jurors “serve[d] the State’s entirely proper interest in obtaining a single 
jury . . . that could impartially decide all of the issues” in the case. Id. at 180. Consequently, 
the capital defendant should have the chance to use peremptory strikes—and twice as many 
as the prosecution—to try to ameliorate the group bias. Or he should be able to prevent any 
use of peremptories. 
42 This approach, as a replacement for Batson doctrine, would both over- and 
underrespond to the perceived problem of inequality harm. Parties would frequently prevent 
their opponents from using peremptories that were not based on race or gender and would 
frequently allow their opponents to use peremptories that were based on those factors. For 
more on this approach, see infra Part VI.  
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challenges promote group bias is infeasible. In response to the problem, Part VI 
endorses a nonconstitutionally mandated remedy that, while imperfect, would likely 
achieve better outcomes than we currently obtain from relying on Batson doctrine. 
This remedy centers on allowing peremptory challenges by consent.  
 
II.  BATSON DOCTRINE AND CONCERN FOR EXCUSED JURORS 
 
In this Part, I show why the Supreme Court has located the constitutional harm 
from peremptories grounded on race or gender primarily with the excluded juror. 
The Court’s equal protection approach rests on the idea that venire persons who face 
excusal based on their race or gender feel denigrated and are unjustly denied a 
valuable opportunity for civic service. There are serious problems with the substance 
of this theory and with some of the corollary ideas the Court has fostered to make it 
function to restrain peremptories. Because of these difficulties, various 
commentators believe the Court should have located the constitutional harm 
primarily with the litigant against whom a prohibited peremptory operates.43 This 
alternative approach would rest on a theory of promoting representativeness on 
juries, an idea that originated from the right of a criminal defendant to an “impartial 
jury” under the Sixth Amendment.44 One of my larger themes in this Article is that 
neither a theory of unequal treatment of excused jurors nor one asserting denial to 
litigants of a representative jury appropriately describes the central dilemma posed 
by peremptories today. Indeed, there is no constitutional theory that works well to 
get at the real problem. Nonetheless, in this Part, I explain why, as between equal 
protection and representativeness, the Court would have wanted to use equal 
protection to support its Batson doctrine.  
 
A.  The Pre-Batson Approach to Peremptory Challenges 
 
Lingering efforts in the Jim Crow South, still operating after Brown v. Board 
of Education,45 to generally keep black persons off of juries caused the Court to 
begin thinking about how to regulate peremptory challenges.46 Well after the Civil 
War and the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, some states tried to keep black 
persons off by law.47 Yet, the Court ruled, beginning with Strauder v. West 
                                                 
43 See infra text accompanying notes 96–101. 
44 See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979) (striking down Missouri law 
that allowed women to opt out of jury service by filing written request); Taylor v. Louisiana, 
419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (invalidating Louisiana law that required women to file a written 
request before they would be summoned for jury service).  
45 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
46 For the first post-Brown case in which the Court confronted the problem, see Swain 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).  
47 For example, in 1873, West Virginia passed a law that provided, “All white male 
persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to 
serve as jurors, except as herein provided.” Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 
(1879). 
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Virginia,48 that the Equal Protection Clause forbids state laws that disallow jury 
service based on race.49 Therefore, jury commissioners in places like Alabama, 
which had large black populations,50 had to make at least some token efforts to 
integrate jury venires.51 This requirement turned out not to be so problematic for the 
commissioners because litigants could retain white homogeneity on juries if they 
only knocked off the relatively few black persons on the venires with peremptories.52 
The tactic was not limited to trials involving interracial disputes. Apparently, many 
white litigants did not want a mixed jury whether or not other participants in the trial 
were black.53 However, the efforts to use strikes against black persons caused the 
greatest affront in interracial criminal cases, where black victims or defendants 
sometimes suffered what seemed the worst injustices.54 All-white juries regularly 
exonerated white defendants of murders of black persons based on self-defense, 
“even when that finding was wildly implausible.”55 Racial bias by all-white juries 
against black criminal defendants was equally virulent. From 1930 to 1968, “[o]f the 
455 men executed for rape, 405, or 89 percent,” were black men, “virtually all of 
whom were accused of raping white women,” while apparently not a single white 
man was ever executed “for raping a black victim.”56 
There was some uncertainty over how to describe the constitutional claim 
against what was going on.57 Was the problem that litigants were being harmed by 
the excusals because black jurors would sometimes provide views and decisions that 
                                                 
48 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
49 Id. at 310; see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (finding a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment where the government used facially neutral jury selection laws 
to systematically exclude persons of Mexican descent); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 
599 (1935) (same, but where black persons were systematically excluded). 
50 See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 232 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (noting that the black 
population of Talladega County, Alabama, comprised 26% of the total population). 
51 See id. at 205 (majority opinion) (noting that jury commissioners included an average 
of six to seven black persons on jury venires in criminal cases). 
52 See, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967) (noting that the seven black 
persons included on the venire of ninety persons were all eliminated at the jury selection 
stage). 
53 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 234–35 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).  
54 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, 
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156 (1989) 
(describing the use of peremptories in black-defendant cases as “especially offensive and 
especially visible”). 
55 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 118 (2011). 
56 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Coker v. Georgia: Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past, in 
DEATH PENALTY STORIES 171, 192–93 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009) 
(citations omitted). 
57 See, e.g., Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: 
Whose Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 725 (1992) (questioning whether 
prohibiting race-based jury selection stems from a desire to protect litigants from biased 
juries, or from a desire to protect excluded jurors and the class they represent). 
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were different from white jurors?58 Or was the problem that black venire persons 
were being treated unequally based on assumptions that their skin color mattered 
when it actually had little to do with how they would deliberate and decide cases?59 
If it was litigants who were harmed, was it only black litigants, or any litigant who 
preferred the excluded black venire persons?60 Also, if there was harm to someone, 
was it outweighed by the benefits of peremptories in sometimes eliminating the more 
extreme venire persons who had not been excused for cause? After all, peremptories 
were part of an old common law tradition, which suggested that they generally 
served good ends.61 
The inability of even the Warren Court, at the height of its equal protection 
activism,62 to agree that trial litigants had a cognizable constitutional claim 
underscored the difficulty of explaining it. In 1965, in Swain v. Alabama,63 by a six-
to-three margin, the Warren Court rejected a criminal defendant’s equal protection 
challenge to a prosecutor’s use of peremptories to exclude all black persons from his 
jury.64 A nineteen-year-old black man, Robert Swain, had been convicted and 
sentenced to death for the rape of a seventeen-year-old white woman in Talladega 
County, Alabama.65 The case was especially troubling because, although 26% of the 
persons eligible for jury service in Talladega County were black and grand juries 
there regularly included black persons,66 not a single black person had served on a 
Talladega County petit jury since about 1950.67 Those who made it onto venires 
were excluded either for cause or through peremptories, although the state had not 
been solely responsible for challenging all of them.68 
Justice White, writing for the Court, conceded that a prima facie case could be 
made where the party brought proof showing that, in case after case, regardless of 
the circumstances, the prosecutor in a county always used peremptories to ensure 
that no black persons served on juries.69 In those circumstances, there was a 
                                                 
58 See Muller, supra note 32, at 101 (“The Court’s pre-Batson cases on grand and petit 
jury discrimination reflected a commitment to the view that one might rationally glean some 
hint of a person’s perspective from his or her race or gender.”). 
59 See id. (noting that, at one point, the Court adopted the view that race and gender 
were “flatly irrational predictors of juror perspective”). 
60 The Court eventually confronted this question in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 
(1991), and answered that the complaining litigant did not have to be of the same race as the 
excluded juror. See id. at 402. 
61 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
62 For a summary of the Court’s efforts from the mid-1950s through the early 1970s to 
expand equal protection safeguards in the sphere of criminal procedure, see Scott W. Howe, 
The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From Brown to 
Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 379–85 (2001).  
63 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
64 See id. at 209. 
65 See id. at 203. 
66 See id. at 232 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
67 See id. at 205 (majority opinion). 
68 See id. at 224–26. 
69 See id. at 223–24. 
2015] DESELECTING BIASED JURIES 299 
reasonable inference that the exclusions were “for reasons wholly unrelated to the 
outcome of the particular case” and, instead, were to deny black persons “the same 
right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by” white 
persons.70 However, all nine Justices concluded that Swain was required to prove 
the prosecution had “systematically” used peremptories to exclude black persons, 
not just in his case but “over a period of time.”71 And the majority ruled that, despite 
the historical evidence that for more than a decade no black person had served on 
any trial jury in Talladega County, Swain needed more evidence about the 
prosecutor’s role in the excusals to meet this burden.72 
 
B.  Batson and the Equal Protection Theory Advanced 
 
Coming at the tail end of Chief Justice Burger’s tenure and mostly during the 
subsequent era of the Rehnquist Court,73 Batson and its progeny were extraordinary 
for overruling a Warren Court decision denying relief to a criminal defendant on an 
equal protection claim. Yet, even Justice White rather remarkably embraced the 
rejection in his concurring opinion in Batson that opened by noting, “The Court 
overturns the principal holding” in the Swain opinion (which Justice White had 
written for the Court).74 The equal protection issue likely would not have gone before 
the Court in Batson had the petitioner not presented the case as one focused only on 
a Sixth Amendment claim for representativeness, which avoided any need to 
reconsider the equal protection ruling in Swain.75 The Court had granted certiorari 
on only the Sixth Amendment question, and the case was fought on those grounds 
alone.76 Nonetheless, some of the Justices apparently changed their minds after oral 
                                                 
70 Id. at 224. 
71 Id. at 227; see also id. at 232–35 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the standard 
but contending that Swain had made a prima facie case). 
72 See id. at 227 (majority opinion). 
73 The majority of Batson doctrine was articulated in cases decided after 1986, during 
the era of the Rehnquist Court. For a discussion of those cases, see supra notes 17–23 and 
accompanying text. Batson itself was decided only a few weeks before Chief Justice Warren 
Burger announced his retirement and President Ronald Reagan named Justice Rehnquist as 
his choice to become Chief Justice. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986) 
(“Decided April 30, 1986”); President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on the Resignation of 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and the Nominations of William H. 
Rehnquist to be Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia to be an Associate Justice (June 17, 1986), 
available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/61786e.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/7AE6-G8XJ.  
74 Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (White, J., concurring). 
75 The dissent emphasized the “truly extraordinary” nature of the Court’s decision in 
light of the petitioner’s express determination not to raise the equal protection argument in 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky or in the Supreme Court of the United States. See id. at 112–
18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
76 See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women’s Rights and 
Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139, 1152 (1993) (“The grant of certiorari had not 
mentioned equal protection nor had Batson’s counsel urged any such ground.”). 
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arguments. The Batson opinion brought a “major surprise” when it not only limited 
peremptories but also when it did so on equal protection grounds, thus contravening 
Swain.77 
The key to viewing Batson doctrine as semisensible is to understand it as 
designed to preserve peremptories and to modestly check their use against certain 
historically excluded groups—particularly black persons and women—by all parties 
in all cases. Reliance on an equal protection theory enabled the Court to achieve this 
goal. Because the equal protection theory rested on harm to the excluded juror, it 
could apply to the use of peremptories by all parties in both criminal and civil cases 
as long as the Court found state action when a private litigant exercised a 
peremptory, which it did.78 At the same time, because equal protection law required 
invidious intent by the actor,79 even the disproportionate use of peremptories against 
black persons and women was not automatically prohibited.80 The effect was to 
maintain peremptories and to, at least, prevent situations like the one in Swain in 
which black persons or women were entirely or largely excluded from jury service 
in a county for several years.81 
Despite the benefits of the equal protection approach, it posed a conundrum. 
The question was how to overcome the claim that inequality harm to an excused 
juror involves no harm to the party opposing the strike. Inequality harm to the 
excused juror derives from the idea that peremptory strikes focused on race or gender 
assume a relevant difference between jurors that does not exist or, at least, is 
significantly overestimated. After all, to treat unalike jurors unalike is not unequal 
treatment.82 Yet, if we assume that the race and sex of a juror does not bear on how 
the juror would deliberate or vote, there is no harm to an opposing litigant from a 
                                                 
77 Pizzi, supra note 34, at 110. 
78 See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992) (criminal defendant); 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620–28 (1991) (private civil litigant).  
79 See, e.g., Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519, 520–22 (1903) (rejecting equal 
protection challenge to the exclusion of black persons from jury venire due to lack of 
evidence of intent to discriminate); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 
(1987) (affirming a death sentence in the face of an equal protection challenge based on 
statistical evidence of racially disparate application of the death penalty due to lack of 
evidence that the petitioner’s jury harbored an intent to discriminate on racial grounds). 
80 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (holding that, in response to an objection to a 
challenge to a black venire person, the State need only provide a “neutral explanation” and 
“emphasiz[ing] that the prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise 
of a challenge for cause”); id. at 101 (White, J., concurring) (“[I]t is not unconstitutional, 
without more, to strike one or more blacks from the jury.”). 
81 See Marder, supra note 1, at 1701 (“Lawyers might still exercise discriminatory 
peremptories, but they might not do it as often and certainly not in as obvious a manner as 
pre-Batson.”). 
82 See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 414 (William Rehg trans., 1998) (noting that 
the “principle of substantive legal equality . . . holds that what is equal in all relevant respects 
should be treated equally, and what is unequal should be treated unequally”). 
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race- or gender-based peremptory strike.83 On that view, the opposing litigant should 
have no standing to object to the peremptory,84 and an erroneous ruling upholding 
an impermissible strike should always be harmless error.85  
The Court offered bold assertions to support its theories of inequality and 
standing, and it largely sidestepped the conundrum over harmless error. 86 First, the 
Court declared that race and gender had nothing to do with the likely views of venire 
persons so that peremptories based on race and gender treated them unequally.87 
Second, it declared that opposing litigants, including those not of the excluded venire 
person’s race, had standing based on a fear engendered by witnessing mistreatment 
                                                 
83 See, e.g., Muller, supra note 32, at 122–23 (noting that if “[r]ace and gender are . . . 
false proxies for viewpoint” when there is a peremptory strike based on race or gender, then 
“nothing is lost”). 
84 The Court had so held in a prior case involving an alleged denial of equal protection 
on the basis of sex in which a black male defendant argued, among other things, that the 
State’s method of composing its jury pool had excluded women. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 
405 U.S. 625, 633 (1972). The Court concluded that, when urged by a male, “there is nothing 
in past adjudications suggesting that petitioner himself has been denied equal protection by 
the alleged exclusion of women from grand jury service.” Id. 
85 An argument could, in theory, thread through the difficulty by acknowledging that 
race and gender stereotypes are not accurate enough to justify peremptories but are 
sufficiently accurate to make an impermissible strike potentially outcome determinative in a 
trial, giving rise to both standing in the opposing litigant and the possibility for reversal on 
direct appeal. However, the argument would seem to call for extensive evidence about just 
how well racial and gender stereotypes can predict juror attitudes in various circumstances. 
Also, even with such information, the argument would likely end up nuanced, cerebral and 
stunted in rhetorical force. 
Regarding the question of reversal on direct appeal, the Court could have said there was 
error but that it was harmless and did not justify reversal. However, “without the remedy of 
reversal, the Court’s strong words about the egregiousness of race-based peremptories might 
be dismissed as merely idealistic or hortatory.” Babcock, supra note 76, at 1158. 
86 The Court could concede that race and gender can be rational proxies for juror 
attitudes but simply declare, nonetheless, that, in the view of the law, peremptories based on 
race and gender excluded jurors unequally. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 
127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Individuals are not expected to ignore as jurors 
what they know as men—or women.”). However, because this position also reflects 
inconsistency, it is not much more satisfying than the Court’s conflicting views that qualified 
jurors are all fungible, but that Batson errors are per se reversible on direct appeal.  
87 See, e.g., id. at 139 (majority opinion) (emphasizing lack of support for conclusion 
that gender can accurately predict juror attitudes); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) 
(declaring excusal based on race as “arbitrary”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 
U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (contending that the only “rational” method for excusing a juror with 
a peremptory is “without the use of classifications based on ancestry or skin color”); Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986) (asserting that “[a] person’s race” has nothing to do 
with “qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence presented at trial”); see also 
Muller, supra note 32, at 96 (“[T]he Court has firmly rejected the idea that a juror’s race or 
gender has any bearing on how that juror will view the evidence in a case or vote on the 
question of guilt or innocence.”). 
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of the excluded persons that some unfairness could also be inflicted on them.88 Third, 
the Court mandated reversal on appeal for every Batson violation without inquiry 
into whether the violation constituted harmless error.89 
These conclusions provoked claims of incoherence.90 The first conclusion—
that juror’s races and genders do not influence their deliberations and decisions—
conflicted with the Court’s own prior statements on the importance of maintaining 
representativeness in jury pools and venires,91 and few trial lawyers believe that the 
race and gender of jurors never matter.92 The second conclusion—that criminal 
defendants feel fear from witnessing mistreatment of jurors excused by the 
prosecution—also lacked the ring of truth. Does the criminal defendant who loses 
the battle over the prosecution’s peremptory excusal of a black venire person really 
feel fear because of a perceived denial of the venire person’s constitutional rights? 
Or does he feel frustration instead because his own racially based attempt to get the 
person on the jury to gain a hopefully empathetic perspective has failed?93 Moreover, 
the third conclusion—that Batson errors require reversal on appeal—does not square 
with the first conclusion that all qualified jurors are fungible. If jurors are all the 
same, Batson errors should never have any effect on the outcome of a trial and, thus, 
should never warrant reversal.94 Professor Eric L. Muller has called the juxtaposition 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (“The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges 
by the prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury . . . because racial 
discrimination in the selection of jurors . . . places the fairness of a criminal proceeding in 
doubt.” (citations omitted)); see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140 (“The litigants are harmed by 
the risk that the prejudice that motivated the discriminatory selection of the jury will infect 
the entire proceedings.”). 
89 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 (holding that “prima facie, purposeful 
discrimination” without “a neutral explanation” for the exclusion of all “black persons” was 
sufficient to reverse conviction); see also Babcock, supra note 76, at 1158 (noting that while 
the Court has not required automatic reversal for Batson errors in habeas corpus, it “does not 
demand proof of harm to the jury’s decision-making before reversing judgments on the direct 
appeal of Batson cases”).  
90 See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 157–63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority 
opinion contradicts earlier Sixth Amendment jurisprudence regarding gender representation 
on juries, and has led to the creation of an “illogical” doctrine). 
91 See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that systematic exclusion of black persons from grand and petit juries violated the Due 
Process Clause because exclusion of “any large and identifiable segment of the community” 
forecloses “a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any 
case that may be presented”); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946) (using 
supervisory powers over federal courts to require inclusion of women in jury venires because 
“the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is different from a 
community composed of both”); see also Muller, supra note 32, at 103 (asserting that “the 
Court has, with increasing firmness and stridency, rejected the very theory of difference that 
it had embraced for many years in its earlier jury discrimination cases”). 
92 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“We know that like race, 
gender matters.”). 
93 See id. at 158 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
94 See, e.g., Muller, supra note 32, at 96 (“Thus the Court has articulated a package of 
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of the first and third conclusions a “contradiction” so profound as to reveal that 
“something is amiss in the Court’s response to the discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges.”95 
The “paradox” created by the use of the equality theory has caused some 
commentators to conclude that the Court should have employed the Sixth 
Amendment theory of representativeness to support its Batson doctrine.96 The 
representativeness theory was grounded in decisions in which the Court held that 
states could not use methods to construct jury pools or venires that substantially 
underrepresented certain cognizable groups, including black persons, women, and 
Mexican Americans.97 Those decisions rested on the notion that a venire constructed 
by methods that would substantially underrepresent important segments of the 
community would likely reflect a different mix of perspectives than one that was 
representative.98 The Court had never held the same kind of rules about 
representativeness applied regarding an actual jury that applied to a venire.99 
Nonetheless, it had prohibited certain state actions that might impair 
representativeness at the stage of seating a jury, such as laws calling for juries of less 
than six100 or improper exclusions of venire persons in capital cases based on their 
                                                 
rights which, in logic, require no appellate remedy.”); see also id. at 123 (explaining that the 
Court’s rejection of the difference theory would mean that a Batson error would not be a true 
“structural error” justifying automatic reversal under Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 
309 (1991), because by definition the fungibility of jurors would make every error harmless); 
Babcock, supra note 76, at 1158 (asserting that “we might have expected that the Court 
would require some showing of prejudice before ordering reversal”). 
95 See Muller, supra note 32, at 126; cf. Babcock, supra note 76, at 1158 (describing as 
“odd” the Court’s view on habeas that “racial bias in the exercise of peremptory challenges 
does not automatically affect the jury’s truth-finding function” when the Court has not 
demanded “proof of harm to the jury’s decision-making before reversing judgments on the 
direct appeal of Batson cases”). 
96 See, e.g., Muller, supra note 32, at 131–48 (outlining the Sixth Amendment as a 
better analysis for Batson violations). For a variety of other reasons as well, commentators 
have contended that the Court might have relied on this representativeness concept. See 
Marder, supra note 32, at 1114–36; Pizzi, supra note 34, at 117–19. 
97 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (noting that the exclusion of black 
persons, women, or Mexican Americans from jury venires in criminal cases would violate 
the representativeness requirement).  
98 See id. (asserting that the lack of members of cognizable groups could “deny criminal 
defendants the benefit of the common-sense judgment of the community”); Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 (1975) (reversing male defendant’s conviction largely on view 
that “a flavor, a distinct quality” was missing from his jury venire because of the 
underrepresentation of women (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193–94 
(1946)). 
99 See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (“[W]e impose no requirement that petit juries 
actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the 
population.”). 
100 See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J.) 
(concluding that five-member juries are not “juries” promised by the Sixth Amendment, 
because having fewer than six members “prevents juries from truly representing their 
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qualms about the death penalty.101 Those precedents arguably could have given the 
Court a basis to decide the Batson case under the Sixth Amendment and, by 
acknowledging the differences among different groups of jurors, to avoid the 
challenge posed by equal protection theory. 
The disadvantage of the Sixth Amendment was that it would have required even 
more labored positions than equal protection in getting the Court to the outcome it 
achieved with Batson doctrine. The Sixth Amendment theory was both too weak and 
too strong. It was too weak in that it would not easily support the regulation of 
peremptories, certainly not across all cases. States need not preserve 
representativeness in the face of other proper concerns102 (the Court decided a case 
that made precisely that point only five days after it decided Batson).103 The very 
notion that different cognizable groups will have different perspectives suggests that 
states have a “legitimate interest”104 in allowing litigants to exercise peremptories 
based on racial and gender grounds to try to promote maximum neutrality.105 In any 
event, the representativeness theory also would not readily limit anyone other than 
prosecutors.106 On its face, the Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants and 
does not govern criminal defense lawyers or private civil litigants.107 Assuming 
those problems could be overcome, the Sixth Amendment approach was also too 
strong because it would not carry the same limiting principle as equal protection in 
circumstances where it did apply.108 Without an invidious intent requirement, which 
                                                 
communities”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (holding that six-person juries 
in criminal cases are permissible because they do not prevent the “possibility for obtaining a 
representative cross-section of the community”). Although some confusion has arisen over 
whether Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Ballew was for the Court, Professor Muller has 
explained that his Sixth Amendment analysis did attract five votes. See Muller, supra note 
32, at 138 n.268. 
101 See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 49–51 (1980); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 
510, 518–23 (1968). 
102 See Howe, supra note 35, at 1192–97 (noting that states can depart from 
representativeness goals, for example, by using certain categorical definitions of individual 
impartiality and competency and by allowing excusals based on hardship). 
103 In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 182–84 (1986), the Court rejected a capital 
defendant’s claim that, in light of the Court’s prior decisions allowing states to “death 
qualify[]” juries for capital-sentencing decisions, the Sixth Amendment calls for a separate, 
non-death-qualified jury on guilt or innocence questions. The Court noted that removal of 
the jurors served the State’s “entirely proper interest” in obtaining a single jury that could 
impartially decide both the guilt or innocence and sentencing issues in the case. See id. at 
180. Commentators have suggested that the Court’s simultaneous consideration of McCree 
helps explain why it chose not to use the Sixth Amendment to support its decision in Batson. 
See Babcock, supra note 76, at 1153; Pizzi, supra note 34, at 121–22.  
104 McCree, 476 U.S. at 175. 
105 See Howe, supra note 35, at 1215. 
106 See Pizzi, supra note 34, at 119. 
107 The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part, “In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
108 Four years after Batson, the Court rejected the claim of a criminal defendant that the 
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the prior representativeness cases eschewed,109 the Sixth Amendment would 
generally seem to prohibit peremptories that had a disparate impact on the 
representation of any gender or racial group on the jury.110 The Court undoubtedly 
could have shoehorned Sixth Amendment precedents into some kind of explanation 
for Batson doctrine. However, if the central problem with Batson doctrine was that 
it did not fit very well with equal protection, it fit even worse with the Sixth 
Amendment.111  
Batson doctrine rested on a strained and self-contradictory explanation of 
constitutional harms to litigants, but it got the Court to the outcome it apparently 
wanted to achieve. One could argue the Court should not have twisted so hard to 
make the equal protection approach work out—that it should have simply left things 
where they stood before 1986.112 But the Court could not live with what Swain had 
allowed through its “crippling” evidentiary demands.113 The Court apparently 
wanted to preserve peremptory challenges and to modestly restrain their use to 
dismiss members of certain historically disfavored groups.114 Batson doctrine, based 
on an equal protection approach, achieved that end.115 
  
                                                 
Sixth Amendment would support his challenge to the peremptory excusal of black persons 
from his jury. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 486–88 (1990). Part of the Court’s 
rationale was that there seemed not to be a limiting principle that would preserve peremptory 
systems. See id. at 484 (noting that holding the Sixth Amendment representativeness idea to 
restrain peremptories would likely require their eradication); id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“The contention is not supported by our precedents and admits of no limiting 
principle to make it workable in practice.”). 
109 See, e.g., Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (rejecting Missouri law that 
allowed women to opt out of jury service on request despite the absence of evidence of 
discriminatory intent to deter women from serving on juries).  
110 Perhaps the litigant would have to provide not simply a neutral, nondiscriminatory 
reason, but one that was “legitimate.” See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986). 
However, if reliance on racial or gender characteristics would not be legitimate, although 
representativeness theory would deem those characteristics helpful for distinguishing the 
perspectives of venire persons, reliance on other nonracial and nongender stereotypes would 
also not seem to provide legitimate reasons for challenges that impacted cognizable groups. 
On this view, peremptories that had disparate impacts on racial or gender groups could not 
survive.  
111 See also Underwood, supra note 57, at 738 (noting, among other problems, that the 
Sixth Amendment has “no power to convince us to permit or prohibit discrimination . . . in 
the use of peremptory challenges”). 
112 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 118–31 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
113 Id. at 92 (majority opinion). 
114 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 54, at 156 (describing Batson as “the Supreme 
Court’s effort to tame the peremptory challenge—but not very much”). 
115 See Marder, supra note 1, at 1701. 
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III.  THE MORAL DILEMMA RAISED BY THE BATSON CASES 
 
Despite the Court’s efforts and success in eradicating the worst abuses of jury 
selection that existed in the Jim Crow era, Batson and its progeny likely intensified 
rather than quelled the calls for abolition of peremptories. I contend that two aspects 
of the Court’s work in the Batson cases come together to help stir up rather than 
calm continuing dissatisfactions with peremptory systems. First, the opinions build 
the case that there are always major harms inflicted on the person excused with a 
peremptory when racial or gender stereotyping helped motivate the challenger’s 
action. Second, the Court set up an impotent regulatory procedure to prevent many 
of those precise kinds of challenges. This dichotomy between the serious harms 
alleged and the weak remedy imposed was probably unavoidable if the Court was to 
give opposing litigants automatic standing to object for excused venire persons and 
was to ultimately reach the result embodied by Batson doctrine.116 However, a moral 
dilemma arises for anyone who not only accepts the Court’s description of the 
harms, but who also favors no more regulation than the Court provided.  
 
A.  The Harm Alleged to Excused Venire Persons 
 
In the Batson cases, the Court portrayed the damage to persons excused by 
peremptories as arising in every instance in which a race or gender stereotype 
motivates the challenger. The context does not matter. Whether every black venire 
member in every case for a decade has been peremptorily excused in the county or 
whether no prior racial pattern of excusals exists, the excusal of a black person (or a 
member of any race) based on race, according to the Court, harms that person and 
all who learn of the excusal. Swain implied that the “brand” of “inferiority” and 
concomitant sense of exclusion from all jury service117 arose only where there was 
evidence that members of one’s group were systematically excluded in various cases 
over a significant period.118 Only then was the peremptory being used to signal 
something noxious—something more than simply that the challenger thought a 
person from a different group might be a more helpful juror in the particular case.119 
Batson and its progeny abandoned that position in favor of the view that any 
challenge—even a single one—grounded on race harms the excluded juror.120 The 
                                                 
116 This difficulty would not have been avoided by using Sixth Amendment 
representativeness theory rather than equal protection theory to support Batson doctrine. To 
make the case that peremptory strikes based on racial or gender grounds violate primarily 
the rights of the objecting litigant, the Court still would have had to make a case for injustice 
involved with all peremptory strikes motivated even partially by racial or gender stereotypes. 
Also, the inability to largely prevent such strikes under the Batson procedure would still 
imply the continuing acceptance of injustice.  
117 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). 
118 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965). 
119 See id. at 220–21. 
120 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87–88 (1986); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 
U.S. 472, 478 (2008) (confirming that even a single racially based challenge that is allowed 
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Court also declared that this harm exists in an interracial case where the excused 
juror shares the race of the litigant who opposes the excusal, although the shared 
characteristic would suggest the peremptory reflected concerns about juror bias and 
was not an accusation of racial inferiority.121 
Other factors that might seem to counter the inequality harm to the excused 
person are also irrelevant under the Batson cases. According to the Court, harm to 
the excused person exists even if he suggested during voir dire that he would be 
happy not to serve on the jury.122 Likewise, the harm exists even if the racial basis 
for the peremptory is sufficiently secret so that only a parsing of the record to 
compare the treatment of a person of a different race who gave arguably similar 
answers during voir dire could reveal it.123 Further, the harm exists even if the party 
objecting to the strike was using peremptories in the same disproportionate way to 
exclude members of a different race or gender from that of the excused person.124 
This last conclusion survives even if it is white persons and men whose exclusion is 
at issue, although black persons and women, not white persons and men, historically 
suffered exclusion from jury service.125 According to the Batson opinions, there is 
never room for doubt or nuance about whether a challenge based on racial or gender 
grounds damages the excused person. 
Harm to the venire person also exists, according to the Batson cases, even if the 
excusal rests only partially on racial or gender grounds.126 Where a venire has three 
black persons and a white civil litigant with three peremptories excuses only two of 
them and accepts the third on the jury, we can infer the litigant does not rely 
exclusively on skin color. The litigant may weigh the fact that the venire persons are 
black, but it is only a partial explanation for the decisions to excuse. Nonetheless, 
according to the Court, excusal of the two black venire persons can violate Batson 
and harm the excused persons in the same way as if the litigant exercised 
peremptories based on a hard and fast racial rule.127 
  
                                                 
by a trial court can require reversal on appeal). 
121 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 (rejecting “the assumption that black jurors as a group 
will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant”). 
122 See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 480–82; id. at 488 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
123 See id. at 483–85 (majority opinion). 
124 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (ruling that a 
state in a civil action to establish paternity could not use peremptories to excuse male jurors 
based on gender although the male defendant used nine of ten peremptories to excuse 
women). 
125 See id. 
126 The Court has stated that a peremptory “shown to have been motivated in substantial 
part by discriminatory intent” is improper but has suggested that the party exercising the 
challenge could rebut by establishing that the prohibited factor was “not determinative.” See 
Snyder, 552 U.S. at 485. 
127 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616–17 (1991) (holding that 
equal protection can be violated in these circumstances although a private litigant in a civil 
case exercised the peremptories). 
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Where the harm exists, moreover, the Court has described it as awful. In cases 
involving a peremptory excusal based on race, the Court has called such 
discrimination “pernicious.”128 The peremptory excusal mars the “dignity” of the 
venire person.129 It imposes on the person a “stigma or dishonor”130 that implies 
incompetence and inferiority. The insult is “open and public”131—an “overt 
wrong.”132 Indeed, the person “suffers a profound personal humiliation heighted by 
its public character.”133 Further, the excusal “forecloses a significant opportunity to 
participate in civic life.”134 And “with the exception of voting, for most citizens the 
honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to participate 
in the democratic process.”135 
Where the excusal rests on gender (even if male gender), the harm is no less, 
according to the Court. Women suffered a long history of categorical exclusion from 
civic life that, while not “identical” to that imposed on racial minorities, is similar.136 
A peremptory excusal based on gender “reinvokes” that “history of exclusion from 
political participation.”137 It “denigrates the dignity of the excluded juror[s].”138 
Such excusals are “practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion 
of their inferiority.”139 It tells all who are witnesses that “certain individuals, for no 
reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state actors to decide 
important questions . . . .”140 We also should not underestimate this harm, because 
“[e]qual opportunity to participate in the fair administration of justice is fundamental 
to our democratic system.”141 In sum, according to the Court, no venire person 
should ever have to endure the terrible damage of being excused with a peremptory 
challenge that rested on a racial or gender stereotype. 
 
B.  The Failure of the Remedy to Eliminate the Harm Alleged 
 
Despite the depiction of severe harm to all jurors who face excusal based on 
race or gender, the Court provided a remedial procedure that allows those kinds of 
excusals to persist. Batson mandated a three-step process for evaluating equal 
protection claims.142 First, the opponent of a peremptory must establish a prima facie 
                                                 
128 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986). 
129 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48 (1992). 
130 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991). 
131 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49. 
132 Powers, 499 U.S. at 412. 
133 Id. at 413–14. 
134 Id. at 409. 
135 Id. at 407. 
136 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994). 
137 Id. at 142. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 145. 
142 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986). 
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case by showing that “the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of 
discriminatory purpose.”143 Second, the party exercising the peremptory must 
respond with a “neutral” explanation.144 Third, the judge must decide whether the 
objector has established purposeful discrimination.145 The problem is that this 
procedure generally does not produce a conclusion of improper discrimination, 
although many commentators contend, without much disagreement, that racial and 
gender stereotypes regularly influence peremptory challenges.146 
Some excusals based on race and gender can occur at the first stage of 
establishing a prima facie case, although most occur later.147 A litigant can 
sometimes get away with a few race- or gender-based strikes before the judge will 
find a prima facie case and begin requiring explanations.148 A judge could begin 
requiring explanations after the first objection, which could come with the very first 
excusal that even arguably rests on racial or gender grounds. However, uncertainty 
remains over whether that approach is correct,149 and some courts have not followed 
it.150 And, on that view, if there are only a couple of black members of the venire, 
for example, a litigant might be able to exclude both of them on racial grounds 
without inquiry. The Supreme Court has never amplified much,151 beyond its 
direction in Batson that facts in the objector’s case alone can suffice and that the 
standard is “an inference” of purposeful discrimination,152 over how a trial judge 
should decide when the use of peremptories creates a prima facie case.153  
                                                 
143 See id. at 93–94. 
144 Id. at 97. 
145 Id. at 98. 
146 See, e.g., Price, supra note 10, at 105 (contending that “Batson hearings, originally 
intended to be a remedial measure against discrimination, are no remedy at all”); Marder, 
supra note 1, at 1707 (asserting that “[l]awyers have simply learned how to mask 
discriminatory peremptories”). 
147 See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson 
and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 460 (1996) (presenting empirical 
evidence suggesting “that it is relatively easy for a Batson complainant to establish a prima 
facie case, but that it is much more difficult ultimately to prevail on a Batson challenge”). 
148 See Alschuler, supra note 54, at 173. 
149 Arguably, a prima facie case is generally not established on such facts, because 
Batson suggested that something like a “pattern” of strikes against black persons or 
something said during voir dire or in exercising a challenge would be required. See Batson, 
476 U.S. at 97. However, a judge might nonetheless follow this procedure in some cases on 
the view that, if a prima facie case were to be established a few challenges later, the reasons 
for the earlier challenges would also warrant evaluation.  
150 See Alschuler, supra note 54, at 171 n.75 (citing cases). 
151 In Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162 (2005), the Court held that, to establish a 
prima facie case, an objector need not show that it was “more likely than not” that a 
peremptory was based on a prohibited ground. See id. at 168.  
152 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94. 
153 See id. at 97 (“We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir 
dire, will be able to decide . . . .”). 
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At the second stage, evasions of the Batson prohibition require the skills of an 
average eighth grader. The explanation cannot be merely a denial of “discriminatory 
motive” or an affirmance of “good faith.”154 But it does not have to be “persuasive, 
or even plausible.”155 The Court has emphasized that a “neutral” explanation does 
not mean one that “makes sense.”156 Although Batson said the explanation at least 
had to relate to the case at hand,157 the Court later seemed to abandon even that 
position.158 “Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's 
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.”159 Thus, for example, 
a statement by a prosecutor that two excused black men had long hair and facial hair 
were neutral, nondiscriminatory explanations.160 Likewise, a prosecutor’s assertion 
that “specific responses and the demeanor” of two Hispanic individuals during voir 
dire “caused him to doubt their ability to defer to the official translation of Spanish-
language testimony” was a neutral reason.161 “As long as [lawyers] give a reason—
any reason—that does not involve a juror’s race or gender, then they have satisfied 
Batson’s command.”162 And even when race or gender motivates them, lawyers 
“have learned to provide other explanations for the exercise of their 
peremptories.”163 
The third stage, involving the judge’s determination, also will leave unexposed 
a large proportion of the cases in which a party has covertly exercised a peremptory 
on improper grounds. The Court has clarified that trial judges should scrutinize in 
light of all the circumstances the explanation given at stage two, and, where they 
find it implausible, can infer the ultimate fact of purposeful discrimination.164 In two 
separate cases the Court overturned capital convictions by finding purposeful 
discrimination after rejecting as implausible the reasons given by prosecutors for 
excusing black venire members.165 Nonetheless, commentators contend that lower 
courts usually accept the neutral reasons offered by litigants at the second stage.166 
                                                 
154 Id. at 98 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972)). 
155 Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam). 
156 Id. at 769. 
157 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. 
158 The apparent abandonment came in Elem. See Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 
97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1593 (2012). 
159 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion). 
160 See Elem, 514 U.S. at 766. 
161 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. 
162 Marder, supra note 1, at 1706. 
163 Id. 
164 See, e.g., Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (“In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, 
the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory 
challenge should be believed.”); see also Elem, 514 U.S. at 768 (“At [the third] stage, 
implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for 
purposeful discrimination.”). 
165 See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 
231, 265–66 (2005). 
166 See, e.g., Marder, supra note 158, at 1592 (stating that most trial judges accept the 
reasons given as permissible). 
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Trial judges do not like to accuse lawyers, especially prosecutors, of being “racists” 
or “sexists” and “liars,” but this occurs when judges reject lawyers’ explanations for 
excusing black persons (or anyone who has a race) or women (or men).167 And 
because most Batson claims on appeal come from unsympathetic criminal 
defendants who look guilty, appellate courts tend to reject Batson claims and 
interpret the doctrine narrowly.168 However, empirical studies in a variety of 
jurisdictions confirm that pronounced racial disparities continue in the use of 
peremptories.169 Batson doctrine apparently has only modestly deterred 
peremptories based on race and gender. 
If one accepts the Court’s description of the harms that result from 
discriminatory peremptories, Batson doctrine’s failure to stop them is cause for 
alarm. Each discriminatory peremptory, according to the Court, does serious damage 
to the improperly excused person and the observers, and it contributes to a general 
decline in the public’s confidence about the fairness of jury trials. Moreover, 
commentators appear to agree that the number of improper excusals is large,170 and 
some contend they permeate the jury selection process at rampant levels and are only 
lightly checked by the Batson remedy.171 Perhaps unconscious rather than 
                                                 
167 See, e.g., Robin Charlow, Batson “Blame” and Its Implications for Equal Protection 
Analysis, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1489, 1493 (2012) (stating that “[c]alling attorneys racists and 
liars is just not the same as labeling them overstepping cross-examiners or charging them 
with offering inadmissible evidence”).  
168 In federal habeas cases, federal courts must also defer to state court rulings on Batson 
claims unless the state court “made an unreasonable factual determination.” Rice v. Collins, 
546 U.S. 333, 339 (2006); see Nancy Leong, Civilizing Batson, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1561, 1563 
(2012); see also Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011) (per curiam) (reversing a 
Ninth Circuit decision granting habeas relief on a Batson claim). 
169 See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital 
Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 10 (2001) (finding 
that in 317 Philadelphia capital murder trials over a seventeen-year period, prosecutors struck 
an average of 51% of black persons but only 26% of similar, nonblacks, while defense strikes 
revealed almost exactly the opposite ratio); Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A 
Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-
Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1554 (2012) (finding that 
“after controlling for several other race-neutral factors, black venire members faced odds of 
being struck by the state that were 2.48 times those faced by all other venire members”); 
Steve McGonigle et al., A Process of Juror Elimination: Dallas Prosecutors Say They Don’t 
Discriminate, but Analysis Shows They Are More Likely to Reject Black Jurors, DALL. 
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 21, 2005, at 1A (focusing on 108 noncapital felony trials in Dallas in 
2002 and finding that prosecutors excused eligible black persons “at more than twice the 
rate” they excused eligible white persons). 
170 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1094 (5th ed. 2009) 
(contending that, given “experience under Batson,” it is “understandable why some have 
viewed the Batson procedures as less an obstacle to racial discrimination than a road map to 
disguised discrimination”). 
171 See, e.g., Marder, supra note 158, at 1592 (suggesting that the Batson check is 
ineffective because “trial judges are reluctant to find Batson violations, and appellate judges 
are deferential to trial judges’ determinations”). 
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purposeful discrimination explains many race- or gender-based peremptories so that 
they actually do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.172 Yet, even viewing Batson 
doctrine as doing a good job of solving the technical legal problem of unequal 
protection, it would do a poor job of solving the moral problem of injury imposed 
through nonpurposeful, unequal treatment. If the story of inequality harm that the 
Court has constructed is accurate, there is need for an extraordinary remedy, and 
only the abolition of peremptory challenges seems adequate.  
 
IV.  REJECTING THE INEQUALITY ARGUMENT FOR ABOLITION 
 
The abolition movement’s failure to gain traction around the country suggests 
that something does not ring true about the story of inequality harms that the 
Supreme Court presented in the Batson cases. The view that Batson doctrine does a 
wonderful job of eliminating discriminatory peremptories is probably not 
widespread. There is little credible commentary supporting that position. The 
shortage of support for abolition probably is not explained by decision makers’ 
unawareness of the claims concerning Batson’s inadequacy. The amount of criticism 
and the esteemed positions occupied by some of the critics making the case for 
Batson’s failure undermine that theory.173 One might ask whether lawmakers and 
their relevant constituents simply deem the value of peremptories to greatly 
outweigh the harms the Court described in the Batson cases. Yet, the Court described 
the harms as so serious, and implied by its view that qualified venire persons are all 
fungible and that the benefits of peremptories are so minimal, that, if accepted as 
accurate, the harms seem to obviously overwhelm the benefits. Thus, what is left as 
the most plausible explanation for why lawmakers have not abolished peremptories 
is that they or their relevant constituents simply do not believe the Court’s story, at 
least as it applies to the use of peremptories after Batson. In this Part, I explain the 
grounds for disbelief. 
 
A.  The Value Differences of Impartial Jurors 
 
The story of great harm and minimal benefits from peremptories that the Court 
told in the Batson cases rests in large part on an idealized portrait of an impartial 
juror. The Court portrayed the impartial juror as precisely neutral.174 She will not 
                                                 
172 See, e.g., Collins, 546 U.S. at 343 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that 
“sometimes, no one, not even the lawyer herself, can be certain whether a decision to exercise 
a peremptory challenge rests upon an impermissible racial, religious, gender-based, or ethnic 
stereotype”); Morrison, supra note 40, at 32 (noting that a lawyer may be “unaware of how 
a juror’s race has affected her decision to strike”). 
173 See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text. 
174 See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991) (contending that a venire person 
who is “predisposed to favor” a party is not impartial); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 
U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (characterizing a gender-based peremptory as one that uses gender as 
a “proxy for juror competence and impartiality” and, thus, denying that such a peremptory 
could correctly reflect a view that one impartial juror may be less favorable than another); 
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lean based on prejudices or sympathies even a little bit one way or the other. She is 
completely indifferent about the outcome of the case.  
If this characterization were accurate, we could easily see why a peremptory 
against an impartial venire person on any grounds, but especially based on race or 
gender, would injure her. After all, the portrayal implies that there are only two kinds 
of venire persons—neutral and unfit to serve. On this view, a peremptory necessarily 
charges, incorrectly, that the excused venire person is unfit to serve, because there 
is no good reason to excuse a perfectly neutral person for another perfectly neutral 
one.175 It also charges erroneously that the impartial venire person has committed a 
double wrong in trying to slip through the court’s inspection by concealing her 
alleged unfitness. When the accusation rests primarily on her nonwhite race or her 
female gender, it also evokes the country’s history of unjust legal classification of 
nonwhite persons and women as inferiors.176 An unfounded accusation of unfitness, 
sanctioned by a court, is denigrating, humiliating, and deeply scarring, especially if 
the inference of inadequacy carries the lingering imprimatur of generations of 
discrimination. 
If the Court’s portrayal of the impartial juror were accurate, we could also easily 
see why peremptories of any sort would have little value. The Court’s portrayal 
implies that all venire persons who qualify as impartial are exactly neutral. 
Consequently, they are also interchangeable—not merely black persons as against 
white persons and women as against men, but anyone against everyone else. On this 
view, excusing one impartial venire person for another will not change the 
deliberations or the verdict in a case. Replacing a nonwhite person with a white 
person or a woman with a man is of no real benefit. All impartial jurors are the 
same—neutral. Peremptories become, then, of only imaginary or psychological 
benefit to anyone.  
The central problem with the Court’s portrayal is that it bears no connection to 
the laws and practices on voir dire and excusals for cause and thus to the actual 
meaning and function of a peremptory. Those laws and practices play out so that 
jurors can hold an array of sympathies and prejudices that make them lean toward 
one outcome or another in a case. Venire persons do not become unfit to serve in 
practical terms except in extreme circumstances. On the nonidealized view of an 
impartial juror as anyone who makes it past an excusal for cause, impartial jurors 
are far from fungible.  
                                                 
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 145–46 (1936) (characterizing impartiality as a 
“mental attitude of appropriate indifference”).  
175 See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 (describing a gender-based peremptory as 
conveying that the excused person is “unqualified . . . to decide important questions”); 
Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 (implying that a peremptory based on race challenges “fitness as a 
juror” (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986))); Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 
(characterizing the question as whether race bears on “fitness as a juror”). 
176 See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 103–04 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing historical 
exclusion of black persons from juries); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 131–34 (discussing historical 
exclusion of women from juries).  
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Excusals for cause generally only eliminate venire persons with obvious 
conflicts of interest or those who openly claim such extreme positions that they seem 
determined to avoid jury service.177 Statutes commonly govern challenges for 
cause,178 and, other than certain disqualifications,179 the typical grounds provided 
“include a blood relationship to one of the litigants, a pecuniary interest in the 
outcome of the case, and previous service on a jury which considered a similar crime 
or a grand jury which considered the same crime.”180 In addition, there is usually a 
general statutory provision,181 or a basis recognized by courts,182 allowing parties to 
exclude for cause any venire person who “is unable or unwilling to hear the case at 
issue fairly and impartially.”183 Under this latter basis, a trial judge will excuse, for 
example, a juror who maintains in the face of the law that the criminal defendant 
must testify or otherwise prove his innocence to warrant acquittal or that certain 
testimony, such as that from a police officer, is always credible.184 However, few 
venire persons will be so obstinate, unless they are committed to staying off of the 
jury. 
Courts can also find implied bias under the general provision, but, especially in 
the absence of extensive pretrial publicity, they rarely do so in noncapital cases.185 
First, so many venire persons arrive with opinions that will affect their votes on a 
case that to exclude them all would leave few to serve.186 Second, voir dire 
questioning, often posed by the judge to the group, is usually too limited to produce 
information that would clearly establish implied bias.187 Except in interracial capital 
cases,188 judges generally need not ask or allow probing questions about sympathies 
                                                 
177 See generally CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 792–94 (5th ed. 2008) (listing 
examples of for cause challenges, including a potential juror who “is unable or unwilling to 
hear the case at issue fairly and impartially” (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY § 15-2.5(a) (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter 
ABA STANDARDS])); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 170, at 1087–88 (stating that challenges 
for cause are often set by statute and “permit rejection of jurors on narrowly specified, 
provable and legally cognizable bases of partiality”). 
178 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 170, at 1087. 
179 See infra text accompanying notes 234–240. 
180 WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 177, at 792–93; see also LAFAVE ET AL., 
supra note 170, at 1087 (noting the additional common ground that the venire person will be 
a witness in the case). 
181 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 170, at 1087–88. 
182 See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 177, at 793. 
183 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 177, § 15-2.5(a). 
184 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 170, at 1087–88. 
185 See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 177, at 793–94. 
186 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) (“[I]t 
would be extremely desirable to obtain [an opinion-less] jury; but this is perhaps impossible, 
and therefore will not be required.”). 
187 See Babcock, supra note 8, at 548–49 (stating that judge-conducted voir dire 
questioning will not probe very deeply, in the interest of time). 
188 See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“Because of the 
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and prejudices even in cases where grounds for concern about bias seem clear.189 
Consistent with these lax requirements, judges often will only ask or permit a limited 
set of objective or superficial questions, such as whether anyone knows any of the 
witnesses or, in a criminal case, whether anyone has been a victim of or witness to 
a similar crime.190 When a venire member raises her hand, the typical follow up is 
merely a question about whether the connection or experience “would tend to 
prejudice her in evaluating the testimony to be given in the case.”191 Those kinds of 
follow-up questions will produce only a few affirmative responses, because venire 
members generally do not want to admit that they cannot be fair.192 Even when the 
judge permits more questions, jurors will generally maintain that they can be 
impartial.193 In the face of a denial of bias, moreover, “[p]rejudice is seldom implied, 
on the reasonable ground that individuals who say they can be impartial should be 
trusted to abide by their oath.”194 This means that venire persons with all kinds of 
relevant sympathies and prejudices will pass muster and make it onto the jury if they 
are not excused with peremptories.195 
Given the rules and practices on voir dire and cause challenges, there is good 
reason to believe that perspectives associated with venire persons’ race and gender 
will often matter. The Court’s contention in the Batson cases that jurors’ race and 
gender do not affect their deliberations or decision making is certainly at odds with 
the views of most trial lawyers.196 It is also “untrue to decades of judicial efforts to 
open the jury to excluded groups, to the findings of social science, and to the beliefs 
of the public.”197 As we have seen, the Court’s own pre-Batson decisions on 
representativeness at the venire stage make the case that juror race and gender affect 
verdicts.198 Social science evidence also strongly suggests that black and white jurors 
                                                 
range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique 
opportunity for racial prejudice . . . . The risk of racial prejudice infecting a capital sentencing 
proceeding is especially serious in light of the complete finality of the death sentence.”). 
189 See, e.g., Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 (1976) (upholding failure to question 
about racial prejudice in case involving allegation of black-on-white crime); Ham v. South 
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528–29 (1973) (upholding failure to voir dire on reactions to facial 
hair although defendant was a bearded civil rights worker defending against a drug charge 
in a small town in South Carolina on grounds that police framed him). 
190 See Babcock, supra note 8, at 548–49. 
191 Id. at 548. 
192 See Mary R. Rose, A Voir Dire of Voir Dire: Listening to Jurors’ Views Regarding 
the Peremptory Challenge, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1061, 1096–97 (2003) (indicating it is 
“psychologically difficult or embarrassing to refer to oneself as biased, [and] also may seem 
wrong in a moral sense”). 
193 See id. 
194 WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 177, at 793.  
195 Cf. Hans Zeisel & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges 
on Jury and Verdict: An Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 531 
(1978) (asserting that all jurors inevitably are prejudiced in one direction or the other). 
196 See infra text accompanying notes 244–245. 
197 Muller, supra note 32, at 107. 
198 See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.  
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on the whole react differently to evidence in many contexts199 and that differences 
also arise in how male and female jurors as groups vote in some cases.200 As for 
public perceptions, several notorious trials in the post-Batson era, such as those 
involving Rodney King, the Menendez brothers, and O.J. Simpson have involved 
heavy media focus on the racial and gender composition of the juries, leaving little 
doubt that the public believes the demographic makeup of juries matters.201 The 
heavy media focus on the composition of the jury in the recent George Zimmerman 
trial only underscores the widespread belief in the significance of juror race and 
gender.202 Thus, even those who oppose a return to the Swain rule would fairly 
conclude “that race and gender are at least minimally rational predictors of 
perspective.”203 
 
B.  Reexamining the Harms and Benefits of Peremptories 
 
If impartial jurors are not fungible and juror race and gender matters, the 
Court’s account of harms and benefits in the Batson cases should not drive the policy 
debate about the abolition of peremptories. The view that individual impartiality 
represents not neutrality but an array of permissible perspectives helps explain why 
peremptories in a post-Batson world, even when covertly based on race or gender, 
do not inflict inequality harms on excused persons and can promote something 
positive—jury neutrality. This nonidealized view of juror impartiality as a range of 
acceptable sympathies raises questions about the sensibility of Batson doctrine 
itself.204 Nonetheless, I do not argue that the Court should overrule or amend that 
                                                 
199 See, e.g., Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 
Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1046 (2012) (finding that all-white juries in Florida are much more likely 
to convict black than white defendants and that gap disappears if there is one black juror); 
Sheri Lyn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1625–43 
(1985) (evaluating social science studies regarding race and guilt attribution; race and 
sentencing; and race, attractiveness, and blameworthiness); Nancy J. King, Postconviction 
Review of Jury Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 63, 66–67 (1993) (reviewing social science studies and concluding that “the 
influence of jury discrimination on jury decisions is real and can be measured”).  
200 See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 140–42 (1983) (“Some differences 
as a function of juror gender have been observed in sentencing recommendations and other 
judgments related to the verdict rendering process.”). 
201 See Muller, supra note 32, at 106. 
202 See, e.g., Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Zimmerman Trial Juror b37 Reconfirms Glaring 
Juror Racial Bias, HUFFINGTON POST (July 17, 2013, 2:18 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/earl-ofari-hutchinson/zimmerman-trial-juror-b37_b_36116 
14.html, archived at http://perma.cc/W3CX-PDYP (contending that the absence of black 
persons on the Zimmerman jury affected the outcome); The Trayvon Martin Case: Race and 
Juries, ECONOMIST (July 16, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica 
/2013/07/trayvon-martin-case, archived at http://perma.cc/WKZ7-FTYZ (“Are juries 
racially biased? Of course they are.”). 
203 Muller, supra note 32, at 150. 
204 We have already seen that Batson doctrine is only quasi sensible, at best. See supra 
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doctrine or that lower courts should not enforce it.205 I contend only that the 
implausibility of the story the Court presented in the Batson opinions undermines 
the inequality argument for eliminating peremptory systems today. I begin by 
rejecting the alleged harms of peremptories and then discuss their social benefits. 
 
1.  The Missing Inequality Harm from Peremptories 
 
There are two central problems with claims that significant inequality harms 
result from discriminatory peremptories in a post-Batson world. First, the harm to 
the excused person is not appropriately presumed because jury service is not usually 
understood as a benefit, and a peremptory is not reasonably understood as 
denigrating. Second, assuming there were some minor harms in a few cases, there is 
still no apparent inequality harm because juror race and gender does matter (making 
venire persons different) and because persons of all races and genders face 
peremptories based on their race or gender.  
 
(a)  The Absence of Harm  
 
At the outset, we should disbelieve the notion that jury service is predominantly 
a benefit rather than a burden to the average venire person. By declaring that jury 
service is a benefit,206 the Court in the Batson cases made every race- or gender-
based peremptory damaging to the excused person by definition. The Court needed 
to portray every such excusal as harmful because Batson doctrine eliminates any 
requirement that the excused venire person object and gives third-party standing to 
the opposing litigant.207 Yet, if jury service is not viewed as a benefit, which it is not 
by average persons, a peremptory excusal is only reasonably presumed as injurious 
if it is denigrating.208  
                                                 
text accompanying notes 82–95. 
205 One could plausibly argue, for example, that Batson rules should only limit 
government litigants, not criminal defendants or private civil parties, on the view that only 
then is there state action implicating equal protection law. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 150–51 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reinforcing that the Equal 
Protection Clause “prohibits only discrimination by state actors” and stating the “decision 
should be limited to a prohibition on the government’s use of gender-based peremptory 
challenges”).  
206 See supra Part III.A. 
207 See Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-Reinforcement, 
Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1807, 1814–15 (1993) (“A criminal defendant 
is permitted to raise Batson challenges . . . on the theory that he or she is being afforded 
standing to raise the rights of a third party—the prospective juror.”). 
208 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 192, at 1097 (discussing how persons view jury service—
as a duty). If a peremptory covertly based on race or gender were denigrating, the denigration 
alone would render the challenge harmful. Cf. Underwood, supra note 57, at 745–46 
(discussing situations where exclusion on racial grounds from an activity that many people 
might “happily choose to avoid” would deeply injure those same people).  
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Indeed, if anyone involved in a Batson dispute was harming another, the litigant 
objecting to the excusal seems more plausible as the culprit than the litigant 
exercising the strike. We should suspect the objector acts based on a racial or gender 
stereotype that implies the venire person will favor the objector’s position. 
Otherwise, the objector probably would not complain. Litigants object in Batson 
disputes for their own ends, not because they care about the rights of the challenged 
venire person. Also, the objector rather than the challenger inflicts the harm, because 
jury duty is more plausibly understood as a burden than a benefit to the average 
venire person.209 People who show up for jury duty have not volunteered as they 
would if they applied for a job, sought to rent an apartment, or arrived at a poll to 
vote; the law has coerced them to appear and serve.210 To say that jury duty is purely 
a wonderful opportunity to participate in democratic government211 sounds like 
proselytism.212 It ignores the hardships that the requirement places on most of those 
ordered to be there.213 For a few, jury service may be purely an empowering, 
educational, and inspiring experience.214 Yet, the likely reaction typical among those 
summoned is that jury service is undesirable,215 and there is no logical (as opposed 
to instrumental) reason to view it as a benefit instead of a burden.216 Moreover, 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., Tania Tetlow, Why Batson Misses the Point, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1713, 1719 
(2012) (asserting that “jury service is an onerous burden for most”). 
210 We also should not forget that some excused persons will already have served on a 
jury and others will have to serve in another trial in the future. 
211 See supra text accompanying note 135. 
212 A disproportionate number of minorities apparently also would find such 
proselytism unpersuasive, as studies, at least in some areas, have shown that they respond to 
jury notices they have received at substantially lower rates than white persons respond. See 
Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of 
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 714 (1993).  
213 See, e.g., Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not To Say Race) of 
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 77 (1993) (asserting that venire 
persons of all races are happy not to have to serve, because of the burden). 
214 In 2011, in Alabama, black citizens, on behalf of a class, sued the District Attorney 
of Henry and Houston counties, and prosecutors working under him, alleging that 
prosecutors in those counties had systematically excluded black persons from jury service 
through peremptory challenges, particularly in capital cases. See Hall v. Valeska, 849 F. 
Supp. 2d 1332, 1333–34 (M.D. Ala. 2012). Although the federal District Court granted 
summary judgment for the defendants, see id. at 1333, the suit suggests that some persons 
view their excusals through peremptories as inflicting inequality harm on them. At the same 
time, the suit may better reflect the view of the plaintiffs’ lawyers that juries in capital cases 
in those counties had been slanted against capital defendants through the use of peremptories. 
See infra Part V.A.  
215 See Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 718 (1995) 
(stating that “most prospective jurors attempt to avoid service”); STEPHEN J. ADLER, THE 
JURY: TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM 14 (1994) (noting that most persons 
who are sent a jury summons never appear, in part because they ask to be excused).  
216 Empirical evidence, while meager, supports the view that persons summoned to jury 
service usually view it as a “duty” for which they would not have volunteered and, further, 
that those who are excused by peremptories do not feel mistreated. A study of two hundred 
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“because jurors are selected mostly on the basis of chance, even prospective jurors 
who would prefer to serve have little personal expectation or claim to be chosen.”217 
In these circumstances, we cannot accurately presume the challenging party is 
harming venire persons by merely excusing them in a single case any more clearly 
or significantly than the party objecting harms them by trying to include them on the 
jury. 
Peremptories based on generalized characteristics also do not denigrate the 
excused venire person once we accept that individual impartiality represents a broad 
range of nondisqualifying perspectives. Neither the excused person nor the 
observers can reasonably view a peremptory in the post-Batson world as an 
accusation of wrongdoing or unfitness to serve.218 If venires include an array of 
legally qualified but very different people, the use of peremptories is merely an 
exercise in “comparison shopping” in which each litigant is hoping to seat the venire 
persons who will be the most helpful to its cause.219 The law requires so many 
relatively subjective judgments that juror perspectives will matter although all jurors 
are following the law.220 The reasonable interpretation of a peremptory is that the 
excusing party believes there are others who will be more ready to see the situation 
from that party’s perspective. 
There is also no special insult involved with a peremptory secretly based on 
race or gender because there remains no reasonably inferred insult at all. There is 
still no good basis to see an accusation that the excused person is a failed human, a 
                                                 
former venire persons by Professor Mary Rose found that persons typically viewed jury 
service as “not an activity most would have chosen to undertake on their own,” and that they 
accepted peremptory challenges as a legitimate part of an adversarial system. Rose, supra 
note 192, at 1097. While there were a few outliers, who Rose suggests may have arrived with 
preexisting negative views, see id. at 1095 & n.121, the vast majority distinguished between 
“the wisdom of the attorneys’ decisions” on peremptories and the fairness of jury selection. 
Id. at 1097. Regardless of the suspected basis for their excusal, they held similarly positive 
views about being “treated fairly.” Id. at 1067. They generally agreed that their duty was to 
appear and be prepared to serve, but that if their service was not needed, there was no serious 
insult or injury to them. See id. at 1097. To the extent that they saw unfairness, their concern 
largely focused not on excusals, but on the judge’s unduly harsh responses to people who 
sought to avoid service based on hardship but were forced to serve. See id. at 1092. 
217 Alschuler, supra note 215, at 718. 
218 Batson doctrine will prevent the kind of situation that the Court confronted in Swain 
and will go much farther by deterring any obvious race- or gender-based peremptories 
although they are not part of a pattern across multiple cases. In this context, excused jurors 
and observers will not know that a particular peremptory rests on a racial or gender 
stereotype. The judge also can take steps to try to prevent venire persons and observers from 
inferring racial or gender motives by not publicizing, for example, which party has exercised 
particular strikes or the basis for any objections. See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 76, at 1179 
(advocating that challenges and explanations be made out of jurors’ presence).  
219 Pizzi, supra note 34, at 126. 
220 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 
1165 (2005) (discussing the variation in jury verdicts due to jurors’ discretionary judgments); 
infra text accompanying note 221. 
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second-class citizen or anything else that is negative. The judge can legitimately 
clarify in advance that litigants exercise peremptories not based on unfitness but to 
seat those they see as the best match with their interests from among the qualified 
venire persons. Beyond that bland conclusion, the meaning of a peremptory, even 
when suspected to rest on race or gender, is far too ambiguous to be reasonably taken 
as denigrating. 
A suspected racial or gender stereotype could easily reflect a compliment rather 
than an affront. Perhaps a prosecutor in a black-on-black murder case does not want 
jurors who are merciful and secretly operates with a stereotype that black persons 
will tend to be more merciful than white persons. She may anticipate defenses of 
self-defense and provocation, which involve subjective judgments by jurors about 
how a “reasonable” person in the defendant’s shoes would have acted.221 She might 
believe that merciful jurors would be more likely than less compassionate ones to 
see the defendant’s conduct as reasonable, although all would be following the law. 
Assuming suspicion that her excusal of a black venire person was partially or wholly 
race based, if the stereotype was about mercifulness, there would be no accusation 
of incompetence or unfitness. Indeed, religious texts suggest that mercifulness is 
praiseworthy.222 
The failure to apply a stereotype also offers no safeguard against offense. 
Suppose a black litigant excuses a white venire person who later finds out that the 
lawyer voluntarily explained at the bench, “he appears from his answers to be as 
dumb as a rock.” Although not based on a stereotype, this rationale would be 
thoroughly demeaning, but perfectly proper, whether or not accurate. Thus, there is 
no logic in the view that a racial or gender stereotype will denigrate the excused 
venire person while a statement regarding one of the person’s specific qualities will 
not. 
 
(b)  The Absence of Inequality  
 
Assuming that some venire persons experience significant deprivation when 
excused with a peremptory, there is still no clear inequality harm—even when the 
litigant covertly excuses based on a racial or gender stereotype. The equality idea—
that equals should be treated alike and nonequals differently—is malleable in that 
its meaning depends on an external rule that defines who is equal.223 In the 
constitutional-law context, the Supreme Court can infuse the equality mandate with 
categorical, external rules that are nonfactual, such as that race and gender do not 
                                                 
221 See, e.g., State v. Simon, 646 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Kan. 1982) (self-defense); 
Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362, 1364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (provocation reducing 
murder to voluntary manslaughter). 
222 See, e.g., Luke 6:36 (King James) (“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is 
merciful.”). 
223 See generally Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210 
(1997) (critiquing the idea of prescriptive equality); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of 
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982) (arguing that in order for equality to have meaning, 
it must incorporate external values and ideas). 
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constitute relevant differences among venire persons.224 However, if we accept that 
juror race and gender can matter, then the inequality claim falters. An observer 
would lack adequate information to conclude accurately that a litigant who has been 
allowed to excuse a truly aggrieved venire person (assuming we could identify her) 
based secretly on race or gender (assuming we could know this) weighs race or 
gender too heavily.225 
There is a second reason why excusal by a peremptory—even when secretly 
based on a racial or gender stereotype—is not easily understood to impose inequality 
harm. All persons summoned to a jury venire face the real possibility of excusal (or 
acceptance) by a litigant based partially on a covert stereotype that the litigant 
applies to their race or gender. Men are sometimes secretly excluded in part because 
of their gender, just like women. White persons are sometimes secretly excluded in 
part because of race, just like nonwhite persons. In the very same case, one party 
may excuse predominantly white persons or men while the other party excuses 
predominantly nonwhite persons or women. Members of all races and genders are 
subject to the same kind of treatment in the process. We should doubt whether there 
is inequality harm in the actions of one litigant secretly using a stereotype to 
challenge a venire person when the opposing litigant is likely using the same 
stereotype to object and to exercise and refrain from exercising its own 
peremptories.226 Although the Court has defined away any doubts on this score by 
focusing narrowly on the actions of the party exercising the strike,227 the moral claim 
of inequality does not comfortably attach to a view of jury selection that takes a few 
steps back. 
 
2.  The Value of Peremptories  
 
When we accept that venire persons are not interchangeable, we can also see 
how peremptories can serve valuable ends. They can promote neutrality on juries. 
The efforts of each party to excuse those deemed least likely to vote for it can lead 
to a jury made up mostly of jurors near the center of the impartiality array.228 While 
                                                 
224 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“But to say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say that 
gender makes no difference as a matter of fact.”). 
225 Two additional points warrant reiteration. First, in the face of a peremptory, an 
objection by the opposing litigant on Batson grounds confirms the opponent’s belief that the 
racial or gender stereotype allegedly influencing the excusing litigant is essentially accurate. 
See supra text accompanying note 93. Second, there is good reason to think that, especially 
in a post-Batson world, litigants who exercise peremptories covertly based on race and 
gender often do not rely on racial or gender rules alone but on multiple considerations. See, 
e.g., supra note 126–127 and accompanying text; infra notes 276 and accompanying text.  
226 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 159–60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
227 See id. at 129, 146 (majority opinion). 
228 Roger Allan Ford, Modeling the Effects of Peremptory Challenges on Jury Selection 
and Jury Verdicts, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 377, 413 (2010); Andrew D. Leipold, 
Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 
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I have urged that there generally is no reasonable basis in a post-Batson world for a 
sense of inequality injury by those excused with peremptories, the benefits of 
pursuing group neutrality counter any minor irritations actually felt. After all, jury 
selection “[does] not revolve entirely around jurors’ particular interests.”229 
Peremptories can promote a sense of fairness in the selection process for the parties 
and a broader societal sense that juries are impartial. 
Whether a jury made up mostly of centrists is superior to a jury that includes a 
representative collection of outliers is not beyond debate, but the overall direction 
of our jury-selection practices suggests that we are conflicted between these two 
goals. If we actually favored maximum representativeness, we would require courts 
to select each jury randomly from a list of every adult legal resident in the 
jurisdiction.230 However, states need not permit noncitizens to serve, and it need not 
scour the population to identify every adult citizen.231 We don’t require states to 
work hard to find those who stay off of voter registration lists or most other 
governmental radar screens, or to keep close track of those who move often.232 This 
laxness disproportionately reduces the number of minority persons who receive jury 
summonses, because citizen minority groups decline registering to vote and move 
their residences more frequently than their white counterparts.233 States can also 
disqualify many identifiable adult citizens,234 including those who suffer from 
mental illness and those with prior felony convictions,235 although the latter 
exclusion has a substantially disproportionate impact on black men.236 States can 
also excuse those whose service would impose on them financial or other hardship, 
which disproportionately excuses minorities,237 although states could usually 
                                                 
945, 983 (1998). 
229 Rose, supra note 192, at 1096; see also Tetlow, supra note 209, at 1718 (noting that 
“their interests should not trump the rights of the defendant, victims, or even of the public to 
a fair trial”). 
230 For a summary of the source lists that states use to find persons for jury service, see 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 218–22. 
231 See, e.g., LAFAVE et al., supra note 170, at 1078 (noting, for example, the federal 
approach of “selecting jurors randomly from voter lists”); WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra 
note 177, at 777 (regarding “aliens”). 
232 See HIROSHI FUKURAI ET AL., RACE AND THE JURY: RACIAL DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 18–23 (1993). 
233 King, supra note 212, at 714; FUKURAI ET AL., supra note 232, at 48–51. 
234 In addition to other categories of persons, states can excuse those engaged in a 
“critical occupation,” often defined by statute and including military, government, and 
professional jobs. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 170, at 1079. 
235 See, e.g., Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. 
REV. 65, 67 (2003) (“Thirty-one states and the federal government subscribe to the practice 
of lifetime felon exclusion . . . .”); id. at 69 (arguing against a lifetime exclusion on policy 
grounds, while still asserting that such an exclusion is constitutional); WHITEBREAD & 
SLOBOGIN, supra note 177, at 777 (discussing exemptions for mental illness). 
236 Kalt, supra note 235, at 114. 
237 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through 
Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 356 (1999); see also LAFAVE ET AL., 
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eliminate the financial hardship by paying jurors well and covering all of their 
expenses. As we have seen, states can also exclude those who meet statutory 
definitions of partiality.238 Even statutory definitions that are overinclusive of actual 
partiality can pass muster.239 States can also exclude in death-penalty cases those 
whose qualms about capital punishment would “substantially impair” their ability to 
vote for it.240 The message that these aspects of jury selection send is a willingness 
to sacrifice jury representativeness to achieve some other “legitimate end.”241 
Compared to the ends sought with those practices, the goal of maximizing neutrality 
on juries through peremptories seems equally legitimate. We should not forget that 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged that peremptories serve a valuable purpose, 
even when based on stereotypes, unless the stereotypes are about race and gender.242 
Despite the Court’s disparagement of race- and gender-based peremptories as 
irrational,243 they can help promote group impartiality as much as many other kinds 
of peremptories that the law permits.244 To limit the use of peremptories, the Court 
asserted juror interchangeability in Batson and its progeny. However, when the 
question is whether we should abolish peremptories altogether, we should not take 
the Court’s claims of “no difference” too seriously. As Justice O’Connor has 
asserted: “[E]xperienced lawyers will often correctly intuit which jurors are likely 
to be the least sympathetic,” and, in this process, “we know that . . . race [and] gender 
matter[].”245 Perhaps Batson’s lax remedy reveals that the Court majority did not 
believe its own account of juror fungibility.246 In any event, from the vantage point 
that race and gender often matter, Batson’s failure to stop all or even most 
peremptories covertly grounded on those characteristics is not so obviously 
negative. 
Efficiency and juror-privacy concerns also favor allowing peremptories, 
including those covertly based on race and gender. We could try to replace 
peremptories with greatly expanded voir dire and excusals for cause. If lawyers had 
more opportunity to ferret out extreme biases in voir dire and judges were more 
willing to excuse for cause, peremptories might become less important. However, 
                                                 
supra note 170, at 1079 (listing economic hardship as a reason for excusing jurors). 
238 See supra text accompanying notes 178–183. 
239 See Howe, supra note 35, at 1194 (noting that these categorical definitions can serve 
the interest in efficiency). 
240 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985). 
241 See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 180 (1986). 
242 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986) (noting that “we recognize, of 
course, that the peremptory challenge occupies an important position in our trial 
procedures”); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990) (emphasizing the value 
of peremptories in “enabling each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial 
toward the other side”). 
243 See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
244 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148–49 (1994) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
245 Id. at 148. 
246 See supra Part III.B. 
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assuming those changes would actually work to expose and eliminate persons with 
strong sympathies,247 jury selection would become a more extensive ordeal, as it 
already is in capital cases because of the need to “death-qualify” juries.248 The 
process would also involve greater invasions of venire persons’ psyches and 
personal lives, which they likely would not appreciate.249 Extensive questioning, 
particularly through questionnaires, enables parties to use peremptories intelligently, 
but lawyers would need to probe even more vigorously to secure the kind of explicit 
confessions of bias needed to support more excusals for cause.250 Peremptories 
enable courts to move through jury selection much more quickly and with less 
offense to venire persons by allowing litigants to act on their educated intuitions.  
In the end, claims of inequality harm to excused persons fail as a ground to 
abolish peremptories.251 In the post-Batson world, inequality harms from excusal 
seem minimal, and whatever sense of irritation or deprivation arises for excused 
persons does not outweigh the value of peremptories in pursuing group impartiality. 
These conclusions apply not only to peremptories that classify as clearly 
nondiscriminatory but also to those secretly based on race and gender. 
  
                                                 
247 But see, e.g., Babcock, supra note 76, at 1175–76 (contending that this approach 
would be ineffective). 
248 See supra note 41. 
249 See Rose, supra note 192, at 1093 (finding through an empirical study that former 
jurors viewed protection of their privacy during voir dire as important). 
250 See Stephanie Clifford, TV Habits? Medical History? Tests for Jury Duty Get 
Personal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2014, at A1 (noting that lawyers use the information to 
exercise peremptories in accordance with perceived “patterns” that “might make jurors more 
likely to find for one side or another”); supra text accompanying notes 187–195. 
251 I also reject arguments that we should abolish peremptories because lawyers do not 
exercise them effectively. Some commentators have contended that evidence that lawyers’ 
nonracial and nongender explanations seem to make no sense indicates that they often fail to 
distinguish favorable from unfavorable venire persons. See, e.g., Melilli, supra note 158, at 
497–99 (suggesting that some peremptory removals are “silly, if not offensive”). Sometimes, 
opponents of peremptory systems have also pointed to empirical studies that show excused 
venire persons often, although not always, would have voted the same way as actual jurors. 
See, e.g., Marder, supra note 158, at 1597 (finding that prosecutors and defense attorneys 
were unable to use peremptories to any advantage (citing Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 195, 
at 517)). My response is that few defenders of peremptory systems claim that lawyers can 
always or even usually change the outcome of a trial with one or more peremptory strikes, 
but this point does not make peremptories a waste of time. In many cases, the evidence 
probably turns out to favor one party enough so that peremptories do not matter. Also, 
lawyers in jury selection often don’t know who will replace the excused venire person, so a 
peremptory does not always produce a more favorable juror. In exercising peremptories or 
objecting to them, lawyers are merely playing the odds as they perceive them at the moment. 
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence does not show that peremptories never or almost never 
change outcomes. See Zeisel and Diamond, supra note 195, at 519 (“We are . . . tentatively 
persuaded that cases in which peremptory challenges have an important effect on the verdict 
occur with some frequency.”).  
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V.  PEREMPTORIES WITH NEGATIVE SOCIAL VALUE 
 
The use of peremptories is not trouble free. This Part demonstrates that 
peremptories sometimes produce mostly negative social consequences, although 
inequality harm to excused jurors is not the central problem. My claim is not merely 
that peremptories reduce jury representativeness,252 because representativeness must 
give way if peremptories are to promote jury neutrality. The real problem is that 
peremptories sometimes both reduce representativeness and ensure the opposite of 
jury neutrality—group bias. In those circumstances, peremptories have negative 
social value, and there is a societal interest in disallowing them. The challenge lies 
in defining through rules or standards the group of cases in which peremptories serve 
those negative ends. 
 
A.  When Peremptories Promote Group Bias 
 
The idea that individual impartiality encompasses an array of permissible 
sympathies helps clarify not only why peremptories can promote maximum group 
neutrality but also why they sometimes will promote group bias. From a policy 
perspective, the function of peremptories is to help produce a jury made up mostly 
of persons near the center of the impartiality array.253 Whether peremptories can 
promote that outcome depends in part on the makeup of the venire. When the venire 
starts out slanted, peremptory challenges can assure that the jury is one-sided. 
Despite Batson, the party aligned with a highly predominant perspective on the 
venire can frequently excuse all or most of those persons who fall on the other side 
of the array while seating many who favor it. The peremptories of the other party 
will not prevent this outcome. 
The Swain case, in which the Warren Court articulated the pre-Batson rule for 
regulating peremptories, demonstrates the problem.254 At Robert Swain’s trial, the 
jury venire included about one hundred persons.255 Black males at the time 
constituted about 26% of all adult men in the county.256 However, Swain’s venire 
included only eight black persons, and the court excused two for cause.257 The 
prosecutor excused the remaining six with peremptories, producing an all-white 
jury.258 
                                                 
252 See, e.g., Muller, supra note 32, at 97 (“[T]his sort of discrimination violates the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury that represents the community.”); see also Marder, 
supra note 32, at 1128 (noting that the Sixth Amendment idea of a fair cross section of the 
community provides “a better approach as a matter of legal theory”). 
253 See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 228, at 983 (noting that “[i]n theory, all that remain[s] 
[after peremptories] are the ‘most neutral’ jurors in the middle”). 
254 For more on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), see supra text accompanying 
notes 62–72. 
255 Swain, 380 U.S. at 210. 
256 Id. at 205. 
257 Id. 
258 See id. 
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If we could ask Swain why this process was unfair, he would surely say that 
the prosecutor had used peremptories to seat a jury that was stacked against him. 
Precisely because we think that black persons might well have viewed the case 
differently than white persons (not that everyone was fungible), we view the 
prosecutor’s strikes of all black persons as unfair to Swain. We could probably also 
say today, under Batson, that the six black persons whom the prosecutor excused 
suffered inequality injuries, because they were probably excused in part based on 
their race. But we would also have to concede, under Batson, that Swain probably 
covertly inflicted even more inequality harm on white persons. The trial judge 
permitted him to excuse two venire persons for every person excused by the state, 
and he used all of his strikes to excuse white persons,259 although he probably would 
have accepted them if they were black persons. Of course, the notion that Swain 
inflicted more unconstitutional injuries than the prosecutor should make us realize 
that Batson doctrine fails to hone in on the most important concern. When the venire 
is imbalanced, the favored litigant can use peremptories to secure group bias 
regardless of how the other party exercises its strikes.  
One of the Court’s Batson cases, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,260 exemplifies 
the problem in stark fashion. On behalf of T.B., the mother of a minor child, 
Alabama sued J.E.B. for paternity.261 At trial, the court assembled a venire of thirty-
six people, twenty-four women, and twelve men.262 The court excused three people 
for cause, leaving twenty-three women and ten men.263 Each side had ten 
peremptories.264 The state excused nine men, and J.E.B. excused nine women. The 
resulting jury was all women, and they found J.E.B. to be the father, after which the 
court ordered him to pay child support.265 J.E.B. objected to the excusals of the men 
as a violation of equal protection, but the trial court concluded that Batson did not 
apply, and the state appellate court agreed.266 On the limited question of whether 
Batson governed gender strikes, the Supreme Court reversed.267 
What troubles us about the factual scenario in J.E.B.? To say that the men, 
whom the state excused, suffered inequality harm seems contrived.268 Would we 
plausibly assume the men suffered significant denigration and deprivation? Were 
they treated differently by each side without a good reason? Did the larger selection 
process treat the excused men differently than the excused women? The answers to 
all of these questions are obvious. What is troubling is not that peremptories were 
used to mistreat the men but that they were used to secure a one-sided jury. For the 
very reason that we believe men and women, on average, could react differently to 
                                                 
259 See id. at 210. 
260 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
261 Id. at 129. 
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266 Id. 
267 Id. at 130–31. 
268 See supra Part IV.B.  
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the evidence in the case (rather than they are fungible), we view the state’s 
peremptories as unfair to J.E.B. This view persists although, from a Batson 
perspective, J.E.B.’s conduct in jury selection seemed as improper as that of the 
state. Our sense that J.E.B.’s conduct does not bear on the unfairness of the process 
to him underscores that Batson does not focus on the right problem. Because the 
venire started out decidedly one-sided, the state could use peremptories to secure a 
jury that was skewed no matter how J.E.B. responded with his own strikes.  
The potential for litigants to use peremptories to promote one-sided juries 
persists today. Batson doctrine will sometimes deter those outcomes, but only 
partially and haphazardly. The doctrine does not purport to prevent litigants from 
using rationales other than race and gender to exercise peremptories. As critics of 
Batson have noted, the doctrine will also only modestly deter race- and gender-based 
strikes.269 Where a venire is already slanted in one direction, a litigant can still often 
use peremptories to exclude everyone, or almost everyone, on the opposite side of 
the impartiality array. 
We can see Batson’s impotence to stop such an outcome by imagining a 
criminal prosecution in a prosperous county near Los Angeles in which an 
overwhelming majority of the population usually votes Republican. The defendants 
are white police officers charged with crimes involving their alleged use of excessive 
force against a black citizen visiting from Los Angeles. The county has a large 
segment of noncitizen Hispanics, but the proportion of black and Hispanic persons 
eligible for jury service is less than 10%. On the venire, there are only five black 
persons or Hispanics and a large proportion of older and retired white persons. 
During jury selection, the defense lawyers use peremptory strikes to excuse all of 
the black and Hispanic persons, plus a young white woman with a forearm tattoo, 
and three young white or Asian American males, one with long hair, another with a 
shaggy goatee who was overheard to say “rad” in the hallway, and a third with disc 
earrings. Although the prosecution objects to the minority strikes based on Batson, 
the trial court declines to find racial discrimination by the defense lawyers. The 
prosecutors use all of their peremptories to excuse older white persons, but the jury 
ends up comprised largely of older white persons. Nobody on the jury is individually 
biased, but the use of peremptories has promoted a jury with group bias. In the face 
of a prosecution case that would likely have persuaded a jury in Los Angeles, the 
conservative, old, nondiverse jury in the nearby county votes to acquit the officers. 
 
B.  Why Laws Cannot Describe Group-Bias Outcomes 
 
The quandary over how to permit peremptory strikes that help secure group 
neutrality, but not those that promote a one-sided jury, has no ideal remedy. As in 
Swain and J.E.B., we can sometimes surmise that peremptories have probably 
produced group bias. Those cases involved the disproportionate excusal of the few 
venire persons with particular racial or gender characteristics in cases where those 
characteristics would seem to matter. Yet, the difficulty lies in articulating a doctrine 
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to identify all of the cases in which peremptories promote group bias without also 
including many in which peremptories may promote group neutrality. We should 
not simply give the trial judge discretion to disallow peremptories where they seem 
to slant the jury. That approach would confer far too much power on the judge to act 
subjectively. At the same time, there is no workable rule or standard that describes 
when peremptories achieve a bad end as opposed to the outcome that good public 
policy would envision for them.  
A central difficulty lies in defining in practical terms when a jury is neutral and, 
thus, when a jury becomes more one-sided. Peremptories inherently tend to muddle 
whatever community representativeness appears on a venire. Thus, a departure from 
community representativeness cannot alone define one-sidedness. We could try to 
imagine the average or median view of a case in a local community as representing 
neutrality toward that case and then imagine a group of jurors who all, or mostly all, 
depart in one direction from that center point as reflecting group bias. However, 
when we think of the situation in Swain, we should realize that the average or median 
view of a case in a local community might itself strike us as one-sided. Perhaps we 
are referring by neutrality to the likely mean or median perspective in a broader 
community of citizens—the larger society. We might say that peremptories promote 
group bias if they help produce a jury that moves decidedly in one direction away 
from this probable societal center. Yet, this “societal” standard, even if better than a 
“community” standard, would fail to give the trial judge real guidance in most 
circumstances. We know the neutral baseline should not be the white, middle-class 
male Christian who speaks English as his first language.270 But everyone has a skin 
color, an economic circumstance, a religious or nonreligious orientation, a gender, 
and a native tongue. If “no one is free from perspective,”271 the notion of the mean 
or median perspective regarding a particular dispute and set of parties is hard to pin 
down in the form of actual jurors.  
The elusive nature of neutrality may also stem from our ambivalence over 
whether it embodies sufficient “closeness” to empathize rather than merely 
sufficient “distance” to evaluate.272 Perhaps even the societal median does not 
represent the ideal neutrality in many cases, including Swain.273 We may want to 
avoid jurors who are either too invested in or too removed from the issue or the 
litigants. We may desire those who are both objective and empathetic. A person with 
dispassion, but a good understanding of the problem and the parties, “is more likely 
to bring to bear knowledge critical to evaluating evidence, credibility, and justice in 
                                                 
270 Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and 
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1207 (1992). 
271 Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 32 (1987). 
272 See Minow, supra note 270, at 1203 (emphasizing that we “want them to have the 
ability to empathize with others, to evaluate credibility, to know what is fair in this world” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
273 See, e.g., Ford, supra note 228, at 409 (concluding that peremptories can make juries 
more representative of the “median juror,” which would also make them more likely to 
convict in criminal cases).  
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a given case.”274 The commonly held but ambiguous notion that a criminal defendant 
should have a jury of “peers”275 may embody this idea of empathy as part of 
neutrality. Yet, acknowledging this additional complexity only compounds the 
difficulty of reaching a practical rule or standard for resolving particular cases, 
where the issues and demographics of the participants vary widely. How should the 
trial judge decide what would be this kind of “neutral” perspective on a case alleging, 
for example, insider trading of securities, or date rape, or an interracial capital 
murder? The answers are not clear. 
The judge also would have little guidance over how to remedy the problem with 
peremptories in a case where she sensed that a venire was not balanced. She could 
call for a new venire, but the new group could easily appear as imbalanced as the 
first. Demographics matter, and minorities tend to be substantially underrepresented 
on jury venires for a host of reasons.276 Proceeding with an imbalanced venire, the 
judge also would lack meaningful standards about how to regulate the use of 
peremptories to achieve a compromise. She could disallow either party from using 
peremptories. However, the party disadvantaged by the venire might still want to 
excuse a few persons that it deemed too extreme; and why not let that party have 
those strikes? Alternatively, the judge could permit the disadvantaged party its full 
allotment of peremptories but reduce or exert veto power over those allowed the 
other side. But this approach would again call for the judge to act with unguided 
subjectivity in engineering the seating of the jury. 
Also problematic, the trial judge in jury selection often will not fully understand 
how a case will play out in front of the jury. A judge can sometimes discern that 
racial- or gender-based sympathies will likely become important. However, often 
the judge at the time of jury selection will not know much about what the evidence 
will reveal or how it might bear on juror selection. For example, in a shaken-baby 
murder case against the mother’s boyfriend, the judge may not know whether the 
defense will present substantial evidence that the mother was the abuser, a gay 
teenage brother of the victim was the killer, a grandmother was the culprit, or the 
child died of injuries suffered from an accidental fall down a stairway. Depending 
on the probable defense, the litigants might focus in jury selection on race, gender, 
age, sexual orientation, or the ability to understand scientific or technical 
information, among other juror characteristics. Understanding what the parties are 
accomplishing with their peremptory strikes will often elude the trial judge when 
she does not know much about the evidence.  
A judge also cannot simply assume that a series of peremptories that 
disproportionately affect a certain racial or gender group equates with achieving one-
sidedness. Where a venire contains a fulsome demographic mix, peremptories may 
                                                 
274 Minow, supra note 270, at 1213. 
275 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (“The very idea of a jury is a 
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not further one-sidedness, although the lawyers on both sides act on race and gender 
stereotypes. As a trial lawyer for the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C., 
in the years before Batson, I exercised peremptories disproportionately against white 
persons, and prosecutors in my cases exercised them disproportionately against 
black persons. Race was only part of the equation, but it was usually an influence.277 
However, the juries in my cases typically ended up racially mixed, and my sense 
was that disproportionate race excusals often did not exacerbate group bias. The 
issue remains important after Batson, because litigants can still disproportionately 
excuse particular racial or gender groups unconsciously or covertly, or legitimately 
on nonracial or nongender grounds. A judge who would conclude that such 
disproportional strikes by a particular litigant always lead to a one-sided jury would 
surely err. 
We can see that the inability to describe in a pithy and pragmatic way the 
peremptories that promote group bias makes impossible a rule or standard that 
prohibits them. The Supreme Court or a legislature could not plausibly order trial 
courts to disallow what it cannot define. We may be sure that peremptories 
sometimes make juries more partisan instead of more neutral. However, efforts to 
address the problem with laws that specify when a jury becomes more one-sided are 
bound to fail. 
 
VI.  A REMEDY FOCUSED ON CONSENT BY OPPOSING PARTIES 
 
While courts and legislatures cannot effectively identify and prohibit 
peremptories that promote group bias, they can rely on litigants to help resolve the 
problem. Because parties desire both to use peremptories to their advantage and to 
prevent jury bias that injures them, courts should give litigants substantial power 
over when to restrict peremptories. This is not a perfect solution, given that litigants 
are not omniscient. Yet, they are best positioned to judge when they suffer harm 
from jury bias sufficient to forego their own peremptories. In these circumstances, 
giving parties a veto power in jury selection would likely promote restraint and 
cooperation that would preserve peremptories but reduce their use to promote one-
sidedness. 
  
                                                 
277 Depending on the nature of the case and the characteristics of other participants, I 
was surely influenced to varying degrees by stereotypes about factors such as age, gender, 
home neighborhood in the city, occupation, dress, and appearance. Additional information 
when available was also relevant, such as any hints of attitudes revealed by facial expressions 
or body language along with any statements made by the venire person during voir dire.  
Although today Washington’s population is 50.1% black, in the decade before Batson, 
its population was 70% black. Andrew Siddons, Barry, Once Washington’s ‘Mayor For 
Life,’ Tries to Shape Legacy with Autobiography, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2014), 
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A.  The Proposed System for Jury Selection 
 
The essence of my proposal is that, except in capital cases,278 courts generally 
allow opposing parties to exercise their allotment of peremptories, one per side, in 
alternating sequence, and that each litigant have the power to end the process at any 
time.279 Parties could continue to object on Batson grounds to strikes by their 
opponents and should receive a ruling before deciding whether to proceed or stop. 
In a jurisdiction that allows a criminal defendant more peremptories than the 
prosecution,280 I propose that the defendant have the option to exercise her extra 
strikes at the beginning, using two for every one used by the prosecution, until she 
uses up the extras. Where there are multiple litigants on one side, I suggest that a 
choice to exercise a peremptory by any of them counts as the decision by that side. 
Under the proposal, one side could altogether decline to use peremptories and 
thereby prevent the other side from using them. Alternatively, one side could go 
forward with its strikes, allowing the opponent to go forward as well. When either 
side declined to cooperate further, the use of peremptories would end with the prior 
round, although the judge could continue to grant excusals for cause.  
The plan could work with either the “jury box” or “struck juror” systems of 
exercising peremptories.281 Under the jury-box system, a group of persons equaling 
the size of a jury takes its place in the jury box usually, and preferably, after a random 
draw from the venire. Some voir dire of the entire venire will previously have 
occurred with some excusals for cause, and voir dire of the panel will continue as 
well.282 Parties exercise peremptories and additional challenges for cause from the 
panel, and replacements come from the venire. By contrast, under the struck-juror 
system, after a voir dire of the entire venire and all excusals for cause, the court 
creates a panel of persons equal to the size of a jury plus the number of peremptories 
permitted to all litigants.283 The parties then use all of their peremptories until the 
number of persons equaling the size of the jury remains.284 The plan that I propose 
                                                 
278 For the exception I propose in capital cases and the reasoning behind it, see supra 
note 41. 
279 Under the approach proposed here, the parties would not need to announce their 
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283 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 170, at 1091. 
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would work easily with a jury-box system. It could also work with the struck-jury 
system if, when a party stopped short of exercising all of its strikes, the court 
randomly selected the jury from among those remaining on the panel. 
The decision about which party should go first is not crucial to the functioning 
of the system. In criminal cases, the court could allow the defense to decide whether 
to propose the first strike, simply on grounds that the criminal defendant should not 
bear any disadvantage from the procedure. In civil cases, the court could employ the 
same approach, although the reasons for such a rule are not as strong. Of course, 
lawmakers could plausibly conclude that the particular interests at stake in different 
categories of cases warrant different rules about which party should go first. 
 
B.  The Effects of the Proposal 
 
The value of the plan from a policy perspective would depend on the degree to 
which parties under- and overused their power to impose a peremptory stoppage. 
Litigants have only “limited knowledge as to the desirability of the members of the 
jury venire,”285 which means that they cannot accurately identify every situation in 
which their opponent could use jury selection to promote group bias against them.286 
If parties greatly underused the right to stop peremptories in cases in which a 
peremptory stoppage would help reduce group bias, the benefits of the plan could 
be modest. At the same time, if parties greatly overused the right to stop 
peremptories in cases in which their opponent was unlikely to use peremptories to 
advance one-sidedness, there could be lost benefits from thwarting the pursuit of 
neutral juries. In theory, then, the plan could have either a net positive or a net 
negative value. 
As a practical matter, however, the proposal does not seem likely to produce a 
seriously negative outcome and could well produce a substantially positive one. 
First, we can safely conclude that the plan would reduce the use of peremptories to 
secure one-sided juries. Litigants sometimes surely would decide not to go forward 
with peremptories or to quit using them early, primarily to stop their opponent from 
using them to advance group bias. In Swain and J.E.B., for example,287 an early 
peremptory stoppage forced by Swain and J.E.B. would have prevented their 
opponents from using strikes to obtain such one-sided juries. 
We can also conclude that the plan would not end the use of peremptories 
altogether. Most trial lawyers believe in their own ability to exercise peremptories 
effectively,288 which suggests that they would generally not stop using them absent 
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287 See supra text accompanying notes 254–267. 
288 See, e.g., Marder, supra note 1, at 1685 (emphasizing that “the peremptory challenge 
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confidence that the opposition could use them to an even greater benefit. Also, 
parties would likely realize that stopping peremptories very early in jury selection 
could make the judge more receptive to motions by the opponent to excuse some 
jurors for cause based on implied bias. In addition, in most jurisdictions, a party 
probably could not appeal a judge’s refusal to excuse a venire person for cause 
whom the party did not excuse with a peremptory,289 which would sometimes further 
discourage parties from altogether abstaining from using peremptories. Further, in 
criminal cases where the defendant had a greater allotment of peremptories than the 
prosecution, the defendant would often have a strong incentive to go forward with a 
few rounds of peremptories to gain the two-for-one advantage that would accrue 
until her extra strikes ran out.290 
Under the proposal, even when a litigant might be inclined to stop peremptories, 
communication with the opponent could spark bargaining that would allow 
peremptories to continue. Currently, jury selection differs from the rest of the 
litigation process “in its complete absence of negotiation between the parties.”291 As 
part of the proposal, I argue that parties should have the opportunity to converse 
outside the presence of the venire persons during juror selection. The power of each 
party to stop peremptories at any time could precipitate bartering between them to 
the extent that their interests coincide.  
The interests of opposing parties will frequently overlap during jury selection. 
First, the lawyers’ competing assessments of panelists and the weight they assign to 
those assessments may often differ, and, to the extent that they do, negotiations 
should ensue.292 If defense counsel apprises a particular juror as a four for the 
defense on its ten-point scale and the opponent apprises her as a three for the 
prosecution on its own ten-point scale, defense counsel may have no serious 
objection to a peremptory from the prosecutor against that juror. However, the 
defense may condition an agreement to allow the peremptory on the prosecutor’s 
agreement not to oppose a defense peremptory to another juror that the defense rates 
as a three on its scale and the prosecution rates as a five on its scale. The likelihood 
that the competing lawyers will assess various venire persons differently leaves 
room for parties to continue with peremptories although one party may see 
advantages in keeping its most favored jurors on the panel at the expense of stopping 
peremptories, if necessary. 
Even when competing lawyers identically assess the more outlying panelists on 
both sides of the impartiality array, they will often have a common interest in 
excusing them, assuming a relatively balanced venire and panel. Litigants generally 
prefer to try to win a trial rather than to try to hang the jury. Even where 
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nonunanimous verdicts are allowed,293 competing sides can rationally conclude that 
their best chances of winning will involve excluding as many panelists as possible 
on the opposite side of the impartiality array. When both sides operate with this 
perspective, they will both be willing to allow the exclusion of some of their 
favorable panelists as the price of excusing those unfavorable to them. If the lawyers 
can converse during jury selection, they can also make these decisions explicit. 
Defense counsel can propose to excuse a panelist whom the opponent wants to keep. 
The opponent can make explicit that she will agree only if defense counsel does not 
object to the excusal of another panelist whom defense counsel would like to keep. 
And if they cannot agree on one trade-off, they may still agree on several others. 
Parties would frequently conclude that preventing all, or almost all, peremptories 
would not serve their interests.  
In criminal cases, one might question whether the plan would encourage 
defendants to regularly seek jury deadlocks, but the concern seems dubious. The 
vast majority of states require criminal juries to find guilt unanimously.294 In theory, 
criminal defendants operating under a unanimity mandate could often decide to 
forestall all peremptories not to avoid one-sidedness but simply to keep the one or 
two outliers on the panel who might strongly favor the defense and cause 
deadlock.295 One might wonder whether an indigent criminal defendant, not bearing 
the full financial costs of retrials, has a greater tolerance for mistrial than many other 
litigants. Indeed, England, which abandoned peremptories in 1988,296 had already 
begun permitting nonunanimous guilty verdicts in criminal cases,297 ameliorating 
                                                 
293 Nonunanimous verdicts, typically by at least a 75% majority, are generally allowed 
in civil cases in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. See 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 233–37 tbl.42. As for the decision rules in 
criminal cases, see infra note 294 and accompanying text.  
294 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 233–37 tbl.42 (noting that only 
Louisiana, Oregon, and Puerto Rico allow nonunanimous verdicts in some cases, and the 
margins required are high: Louisiana—at least 10/12 and unanimity in capital cases and 
others carrying mandatory penalty of confinement at hard labor; Oregon—at least 10/12 and 
11/12 in murder cases; Puerto Rico—at least 9/12).  
295 See Morrison, supra note 40, at 55 (noting this possible objection but explaining 
why it is not a major concern). Contrary to this approach, empirical research suggests that 
the presence of one or two extreme jurors rarely explains why a jury deadlocks. Mistrials 
involving one or two holdouts usually involve deliberations that begin with a wide division, 
reflecting serious dispute over the weight of the evidence. HASTIE ET AL., supra note 200, at 
166–67; HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462–63 (1966); Michael 
J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 41 (1997).  
296 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
297 In 1967, with little prior study, England began allowing 11–1 or 10–2 verdicts in 
criminal cases in response to evidence that some jurors had been bribed or intimidated to 
vote for acquittals in particular cases involving professional criminals. See VALERIE P. HANS 
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any such problem.298 The counterargument to this objection centers on the point that 
the unanimity rule applies against both parties. When criminal defendants see 
persons on the panel who look like strong outliers for the prosecution, they could 
also rationally conclude (like other litigants) that, assuming a balanced venire and 
panel, their best chance for acquittal is to give up their own outliers to get rid of 
those who would strongly favor the government. For these litigants, as for others, an 
acquittal is almost always better than a hung jury. Thus, criminal defendants present 
a challenge for the proposal only on the doubtful proposition that they will, much 
more than other litigants, shoot for mistrials rather than acquittals.299 
The proposal will not prevent all group bias on juries. A jury could still end up 
severely one-sided although the disadvantaged party forecloses the use of 
peremptories altogether. A venire and panel of jurors from the venire could be so 
one-sided that the failure to exercise peremptories would make little difference. 
There may be zero, or only one or two, favorable venire persons on the panel for the 
disadvantaged party to protect. One or two jurors may not matter under 
nonunanimous decision rules, and they may not hold out where unanimity applies. 
Some scholars have suggested approaches that would help address this larger 
problem, such as using racial quotas to constitute juries.300 However, there is no 
constitutional guarantee of a certain mix of views on a jury,301 and any effort to 
                                                 
& NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 172 (1986).  
298 “[N]onunanimous decisionmaking rules can operate to eliminate the voice of 
difference on the jury.” Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2000). However, the Supreme Court has held that the 
Constitution does not require jury unanimity in state criminal trials. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 
406 U.S. 404, 405–06, 411 (1972) (plurality opinion) (upholding 10–2 guilty verdicts on 
charges of assault with a deadly weapon, burglary, and grand larceny); Johnson v. Louisiana, 
406 U.S. 356, 362–63, 365 (1972) (upholding 9–3 guilty verdict in robbery case allowed 
under Louisiana law at the time). 
299 Some percentage of litigants in both criminal and civil cases would see a hung jury 
as their best possible option and, on that view, might prevent peremptories to keep their most 
favored persons on the jury not to prevent one-sidedness but in hopes of securing a mistrial. 
However, this appears generally to be an ineffective strategy for pursuing deadlock. See 
supra note 215 and accompanying text. I suggest that the percentage of litigants who employ 
it will be small, especially where nonunanimity rules prevail. Nonetheless, to the extent that 
this issue raises concern in criminal cases, a response would be to amend the proposal to 
guarantee both sides in a criminal trial two peremptories without the consent of the opponent. 
300 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 215, at 708–09 (supporting application to petit-jury 
context of a racial quota system used to select grand juries in Hennepin County, Minnesota); 
Johnson, supra note 199, at 1698–99 (proposing that each African American, Native 
American, or Hispanic American criminal defendant have the right to include three “racially 
similar” jurors); King, supra note 212, at 711 (advocating racially conscious selection at 
early stages when “reasonably necessary” to promote public confidence in fairness of 
proceedings). 
301 See, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 86 (1988) (emphasizing the holding in 
Lockhart v. McCree that the Constitution assumes when the jury is selected from a cross 
section of the community it can be defined impartial). 
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ensure that every jury were thoroughly neutral at the group level would bring major 
complications, starting with the inability to define group neutrality.302 The proposal 
does not aim to solve the larger problem of group bias on juries but only to reduce 
the potential that parties can use peremptories to exacerbate it. 
The proposal also would allow the party benefitted by an imbalanced panel to 
stop peremptories merely to preserve its advantage. However, this power usually 
would not matter much if, as I urge, the court chooses panel members randomly 
from the venire. If the panel starts out one-sided, the venire was likely equally one-
sided and, thus, even under current approaches to juror selection, the jury would 
likely have ended up at least as one-sided as it would with a peremptory stoppage. 
This is why the advantaged party would rationally want to go forward with 
peremptories and why the disadvantaged party is more likely to decide to stop 
them.303 Likewise, during the process of exercising peremptories, if the panel starts 
to favor a party who then stops peremptories, the outcome should be relatively close 
to the most neutral jury that could have been selected from that venire under the 
current approach to jury selection. This outcome will probably not represent perfect 
neutrality, assuming we could define it. But again, the plan aims to ensure not that 
juries are neutral but simply that peremptories will not skew them.  
A plan focused on consent is not a flawless answer to the problem of one-sided 
juries that peremptories can promote, but I contend that it is the best one. Abolition 
is not a good choice if we hope to preserve some of the benefits that peremptories 
provide. Simply reducing the number of allotted peremptories to one or two per party 
in all cases is also a poor choice because it would respond in categorical form to a 
nuanced problem—largely curtailing the benefits of peremptories while also 
contributing to the problem of one-sidedness. Relying only on Batson doctrine is 
also unwise because those rules only address the problem obliquely. The best choice 
is to enlist parties themselves to determine when their opponents are using 
peremptories to achieve not neutrality but group bias.304 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article began by asking why peremptory challenges continue to evoke 
strong and widespread protest. The standard answer is that, despite Batson doctrine, 
peremptories impose inequality harm on many excused venire persons. I have 
provided an alternative criticism, while also endeavoring to expose the weakness of 
the inequality argument. I have urged that the inequality story collapses in a post-
Batson world because the unconscious or covert excusal of venire persons on race 
                                                 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 270–275. 
303 The proposal could exacerbate group bias in rare circumstances. If the panel is 
freakishly one-sided compared to the venire, the advantaged party could force a peremptory 
stoppage to prevent the opponent from trying to balance the panel with replacements from 
the venire. However, this situation should rarely arise if the court chooses the panel members 
randomly. 
304 Cf. Morrison, supra note 40, at 42 (urging negotiated peremptories as a solution to 
the problem of “the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges”). 
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or gender grounds neither justifies a presumption that those persons suffer harm nor 
plausibly classifies as unequal treatment of them. I have also argued that any minor 
irritation to excused jurors is offset by the value of peremptories in promoting jury 
neutrality, including those based unintentionally or secretly on racial or gender 
stereotypes. Yet, I have urged that peremptories should sometimes still disturb us 
because they can, when the venire is imbalanced, aid the advantaged litigant in 
securing a one-sided jury. The harm is not to the excused jurors but to the 
disadvantaged litigant. 
While my arguments might suggest the view that Batson was wrongly decided, 
I disavow that position. I contend merely that we should not take seriously as a 
reason to abolish peremptories the story of inequality harm that the Court presented 
in the Batson cases. Whether based on the right to equal protection of venire persons 
or on the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to an impartial jury, 
existing constitutional theory does not adequately address the real problem with 
peremptories. The Court aimed in the Batson cases both to preserve peremptories 
and to modestly restrain their use to excuse members of certain disfavored groups. 
The effort produced some positive effects. But the central problem with 
peremptories in a post-Batson world is the harm they pose to disadvantaged litigants 
by promoting group bias. While Batson doctrine has helped stem this persistent 
harm, the benefits have been limited and haphazard.  
Because of difficulties with identifying peremptories that promote group bias, 
I have endorsed a plan that enlists litigants to decide when to disallow them. 
Peremptory systems reflect the idea that parties acting in their competing self-
interests can help pursue group neutrality on juries. In the same vein, allowing 
peremptories only with the consent of the opposing litigant can help prevent their 
use to achieve group bias. As a side effect, the plan would also restrain, substantially 
more than Batson doctrine, the use of peremptories generally and, thus, those based 
on racial, ethnic, and gender stereotypes. Yet, the goal of peremptory systems is to 
pursue jury neutrality, and the ultimate measure of the proposal is its ability to serve 
that end. 
